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ABSTRACT 
MAKING THE CASE FOR PLACE: AN EXPLORATION OF URBANIZATION 
MEASURES ON A MODEL OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND U.K. CRIME RATES 
 
Kyshawn K. Smith 
Old Dominion University, 2016 
Director: Dr. Ruth A. Triplett 
 
Studies of social capital and crime have become quite 
popular in recent history, and a plethora of empirical tests 
have sought to clarify relationships between the two variables.  
However, most of these studies center on communities in the 
United States, and often overlook the many differentiating 
features between urban and rural communities that would affect 
such models.  Reasons offered for such skew in the past and 
current research on this subject are middling at best, and 
largely cite either a lack of availability in data for crime and 
social capital in non-urban communities, or questionable 
accuracy for what data is accessible. 
This dissertation sought to address both the lack of 
research on social capital effects on crime rates in communities 
outside of the U.S., and the lack of consideration of 
urbanization level in such research.  Hypotheses derived under 
these general goals were tested using a combination of 
multivariate regression analyses and structural equation 
modeling on datasets provided by the Office of National 
Statistics (U.K.) and the British Social Attitudes Survey.  
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Findings revealed social capital and crime models vary 
between urban and rural communities.  It was also revealed that 
models of social capital and crime are contingent upon crime 
type and urbanization level.   
Conclusions and implications from this research suggested 
social capital is relevant in social capital-crime discourse in 
the U.K., but not always in the ways that current literature 
suggests it would be.  Additionally, it was clear that greater 
specificity in social capital-crime models in the U.K. is 
warranted as the data revealed such models are only relevant for 
a limited combination of crime and community types.  Future 
research should expand towards clarifying the relationship 
between social capital and crime rates in rural U.K. areas, 
incorporate more definitions of social capital driven by the 
idiosyncratic features of urban and rural communities, and 
consider more exploration of these models in countries typically 
underrepresented in the literature. 
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CHAPTER I  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the social sciences, residential neighborhoods have long 
held a distinct significance as key domains for organizing and 
understanding social life.  Since the latter 19th century, of 
particular interest for social scientists has been the 
connection between structural mechanisms in residential 
neighborhoods, the ecological processes of life in such 
communities, and crime.  Scholars interested in explaining crime 
in these neighborhoods have turned to a number of theoretical 
concepts, with social disorganization, collective efficacy and 
social capital prominent among them.  Recent work has sparked a 
keen interest in social capital and an increasing number of 
studies consider the role of social capital in crime. 
Though definitions vary, social capital is generally 
thought to be the commodity comprised of relationships and 
behavioral norms rooted in social cohesion between individuals 
and/or institutions.  It allows access to certain valued 
benefits (e.g., poverty relief, employment opportunities, family 
stability) and the attainment of goals often unreachable through 
alternative means (Coleman 1988; Coleman 1990; Halpern 2005; 
Neal 2011; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000; Woolcock 2010).  It 
encompasses an array of qualities like trust, reciprocity, 
volunteerism, and civic engagement between individuals within a 
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collective (e.g., residents in a neighborhood, inmates in a 
prison, students within a school).  The last 30 years of 
ecological studies in the social sciences have been especially 
fruitful in framing the current sentiment that areas high in 
social capital are advantaged in a number of ways. 
Seminal research from Robert Putnam revealed how traditions 
of civic engagement – a vital correlate of social capital – 
facilitated democracy in Italy and the U.S. alike (Putnam 2000; 
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). In East Asia, social 
capital has been shown to partially explain economic growth, 
while lower levels have marked the downfall of former Soviet 
republics (Portes and Landholt 1996).  Miles (2012) observed the 
benefits of urban ecological designs in certain communities of 
Istanbul, where social capital exchanges are heavily promoted, 
and concluded similar planning could benefit urban communities 
in his native Australia. 
One rationale for the positive gains resulting from social 
capital is that the bonds of cohesion formed under social 
capital decrease social transaction costs in a community.  This, 
in turn, allows for more peaceful conflict resolutions.  Another 
cited advantage of social capital is the enhancement of social 
bonds between community members.  In turn, this leads to a 
suppression of the “free-rider problem” of collective action – 
individuals receiving the benefits of collective action without 
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contributing to its establishment or maintenance (Lederman, 
Loayza, and Menendez 2001). 
In recent criminological literature, there has been 
considerable focus in neighborhood research on the absence of 
social capital, its components and the related concept of 
collective efficacy.  By and large, this literature has shown 
the absence of these commodities leads to more crime.  
Specifically, communities with higher social capital generally 
possess stronger social networks and support.  These enhance 
overall well-being via neighborhood satisfaction and high 
collective efficacy among those incorporated into the 
neighborhood and said networks (Ferguson 2007).  In such highly 
supportive communities, residents are more inclined to adopt 
both formal and informal measures to preserve their safety and 
those close to them, which in a high social capital community 
often accounts for an extensive matrix of individuals.  
Conversely, communities low in social capital typically lack 
these networks and the associated capacity to prevent harm from 
criminal and otherwise deviant activity. 
It is worth noting that social capital is not conceptually 
tied to any particular type of neighborhood or geographic place; 
it is arguably found in all types of communities across the 
globe where people reside (i.e., urban, suburban, or rural).  
Yet, much of the prevailing literature on social capital and its 
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effects in residential communities is limited by an almost 
exclusive development and testing in Western industrialized 
nations (particularly the United States) and urban areas.  
Woolcock (2001), for example, noted how social capital has 
tended to be exported wholesale from Western settings with 
little regard for the relevance of cultural context in its 
conceptualization: 
All ideas are grounded in language and history, and for 
whatever reason, we find ourselves living at a time when 
most of the best social science departments in the most 
prestigious (and well-funded) universities happen to reside 
in the Western world. For better or worse, “social capital” 
is an idea that has emerged from this milieu…(Woolcock 
2001:17) 
 
As the social capital discourse outside of traditional 
Western settings has lagged, questions have emerged about the 
generalizability of the concept and theories derived from it.  
Similar concerns have been raised about research on neighborhood 
crime in general.  As renowned criminologist Robert Sampson 
(2008) once remarked concerning the overall state of community 
crime discourse:  
A third concern I have about extant community research is 
its seeming disregard for the establishment of generality 
in causal mechanisms.  The prime example is that most of 
our knowledge has been gained from U.S. cities and only a 
few of them at that…our comparative knowledge base is, 
unfortunately, limited – very few multi-level studies have 
been carried out with the explicit goal of cross-national 
comparison of crime rates and community social mechanisms. 
(Sampson 2008:161) 
 
Aside from recognition of the limited exploration of social 
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capital and neighborhood crime respectively outside the U.S., 
most research into these matters is done in urban areas.  A 
number of scholars have voiced concern over this problem in 
studies of crime (Cancino 2003; Cancino 2005; DeKeseredy, 
Donnermeyer, Schwartz, Tunnell, and Hall 2007; Osgood and 
Chambers 2000; Petee and Kowalski 1993; Reisig and Cancino 2004; 
Sampson 2008). They argue that in the U.S., two enduring 
perceptions are related to the lack of attention given by 
criminologists to non-urban areas. 
The first is that crime is not common outside of large 
cities (Weisheit and Donnermeyer 2000; Weisheit, Falcone, and 
Wells 2006).  Accordingly, crime in rural areas has often been 
thought to be more predictable, easier to explain, and thus less 
urgently in need of explanation (Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 
2006). The second is that the crime that does occur is 
fundamentally incongruent with the seminal ecological theories 
of community crime. 
Alternatively, Laub (1983) argued that the extent of 
urbanization is an important determinant of criminality despite 
receiving comparatively little attention in empirical work.  He 
also added that theories of crime originally developed and 
tested in urban areas are just as applicable to rural settings.  
His argument is that the supposed differences between 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan neighborhoods have waned 
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substantially since the genesis of early ecological crime 
theories (Osgood and Chambers 2000; Petee and Kowalski 1993).  
Thus, if patterns of urban and rural crime were shown to be 
similar (even when the respective crime levels vary between 
urban and rural neighborhoods), then those theories originally 
formulated in urban research could and should still apply to 
rural settings (Laub 1983). 
Ecological crime studies in countries outside of the U.S. 
(i.e., those comprising the United Kingdom) reveal similar 
skewing towards urban neighborhoods.  This may be the result of 
heightened difficulty noted in obtaining data from non-urban 
communities overseas.  For instance, Ashby and Longley (2005) 
observed that suburban and rural neighborhoods in the U.K. tend 
to be geographically wider and less densely populated than urban 
communities.  Thus, these communities are harder to cover for 
law enforcement officials and report fewer incidents of crime 
for formal authorities to respond to. 
Lack of police coverage and breadth of crime data obtainable 
for research are inextricably linked in the U.K.  This is 
because in the U.K. crime data often originates at the local 
authority level – a popular geographic standard for defining 
territories and studying communities throughout the U.K. These 
definitions are predicated on the extent of police coverage 
available in communities throughout each of the U.K.’s four 
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countries. As data volume and reporting accuracy have 
traditionally suffered in less urban areas, data collection 
agencies and researchers alike have been less inclined to pay 
attention to these communities. 
Advancements in data coverage and sophistication in recent 
history have reduced some of these concerns about non-urban 
communities.  Concurrently, scholars have increasingly begun to 
acknowledge that crimes common to urban settings do occur in 
rural and suburban communities.  While generally less frequent 
in comparison to urban criminal activity, there is notable work 
highlighting non-urban crime as a significant problem worth 
detailed exploration (Kposowa and Breault 1993; Kposowa, 
Breault, and Harrison 1995; Osgood and Chambers 2000; Smith and 
Huff 1982; Spano and Nagy 2005; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 
2006). 
For instance, illicit use of cocaine, amphetamines, alcohol, 
and inhalants are all more common among rural residents, and 
rural domestic violence rates are also comparable to urban areas 
(Websdale 1995; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006).  Gangs and 
gang-related violence have become increasingly problematic in 
smaller, less urbanized communities as well (Bouley and Wells 
2001).  A number of studies confirm homicides and other violent 
crimes occur in nonmetropolitan neighborhoods at rates similar 
to urban neighborhoods when structural forces like poverty, 
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marital discord and population change are accounted for (Barnett 
and Mencken 2002; Kposowa and Breault 1993; Kposowa, Breault, 
and Harrison 1995; Lee, Maume, and Ousey 2003). 
Yet, despite such insights, scholarship on crime in less 
urbanized settings is still comparatively limited.  This is no 
less the case within the literature that considers social 
capital’s role in explaining criminal activity.  However, it is 
particularly curious that social capital has been so often 
overlooked in light of the supporting evidence of social 
capital’s general relevance in studies in nonmetropolitan, 
foreign settings (Castle 2002; Coleman 1988; Coleman 1990; 
Halpern 2005; Hofferth and Iceland 1998). 
In light of the narrow international scope and lack of 
attention on nonmetropolitan communities where criminological 
concerns are forefront, research on social capital and crime in 
areas outside of the U.S. that vary in level of urbanization is 
clearly warranted.  Therefore, the intent of this study is to 
perform such an examination.  Specifically, this study proposes 
to gather and analyze data from nationally syndicated sources 
covering crime and social attitudes in England and Wales, with 
the following questions to be addressed: 
- Is social capital the same concept between urban and rural 
communities in the U.K.?  Specifically, do traditional 
indicators of social capital (friendship bonds, trust, and 
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organizational participation) vary significantly in their 
levels across rural and urban communities in the U.K.? 
- Do structural factors (e.g., poverty, residential stability) 
similarly influence crime across both rural and urban areas in 
the U.K.? 
- To what extent does social capital mediate the effects of 
structural characteristics on crime?  
The next chapter starts with a brief overview of the history 
of social capital scholarship, including the key figures in 
social capital theory development and their various 
interpretations of the concept.  This section will also 
highlight the various definitions, components, and causes of 
social capital commonly cited in the literature, along with the 
problems resulting from inconsistency in these definitions.  In 
an effort to reconcile the divergence in definitions, this 
continues by presenting a definition of social capital drawn 
from the literature that can be applied to the data available 
for this dissertation.  The chapter then proceeds to review two 
related concepts drawn from criminology – social disorganization 
and collective efficacy – and concludes with a discussion of the 
ways in which social capital and crime may vary across rural and 
urban areas.    
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CHAPTER II  
SOCIAL CAPITAL, CRIME AND THE URBAN/RURAL DIVIDE 
An important area of criminological theory and research 
explores why neighborhood crime rates vary.  Both theory 
development and testing on this subject stems from work done in 
urban communities in Western industrialized nations, and 
predominantly those within the U.S.  In this chapter, social 
capital – a key concept in some theories of neighborhood crime – 
will be examined with particular attention to its history, its 
definition, its causes/components and its relationship to 
neighborhood crime.  As with neighborhood crime discourse 
overall, the discussion in this chapter will show that social 
capital’s presence in this discourse is also largely developed 
from U.S. scholarship and has been applied mainly to urban 
settings.  The chapter will end with a discussion of how it may 
or may not apply to crime in rural areas as well.  
 
HISTORY OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The concept of social capital and theories surrounding it 
are traceable to some of the earliest discourse in social 
science.  Observations from Emile Durkheim illustrated how 
individual anomie and ensuing self-destructive tendencies could 
be quelled through developing strong community connections 
(Durkheim 1968; Durkheim 2008 (1893)).  The earliest recorded 
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application of social capital theory, however, is often credited 
to 18th century Progressive reformer Lyda J. Hanifan (Putnam 
2000). 
Among Hanifan’s main interests was improving educational 
opportunities and quality in suburban and rural West Virginia.  
Hanifan observed how the best schools and brightest students 
were most often situated in communities where residents actively 
participated in local school affairs. He believed that effective 
educational institutions were an outcome of community 
involvement rather than singular efforts, and that individuals 
were socially “helpless” if left to survive solely by their own 
hand (Hanifan 1916).  Beyond its educational advantages, Hanifan 
believed that a host of individual interests were best served 
when the good of the community was addressed.  He further argued 
that social capital carried the potential for compound earnings 
in the form of positive interactions extending beyond the family 
household.  The core precepts of his definition of social 
capital consisted of goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and 
social intercourse (Hanifan 1916:130). 
Modern conceptual expansion of social capital can be 
partially attributed to renowned French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu.  For Bourdieu, social capital is “the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of 
a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
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relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu 
1985:248).  He understood social capital as both the connections 
between social actors that provide mutually beneficial 
resources, and the quality of these resources.  Bourdieu also 
believed that the resources “which accrue from membership in a 
group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible” 
(Bourdieu 1985:249).  Consider for example the kinship between 
members of a neighborhood civic league.  Such kinship is 
grounded in and strengthened by the availability of resources 
made possible through the connections formed between league 
members.  An example would be awareness of lucrative employment 
opportunities, where such awareness is acquired initially 
through interactions with fellow league members. 
American economist Glen Loury (1976, 1981) made an indelible 
mark of his own on social capital theory by way of his research 
on race-based income inequality.  Sparked by a belief that 
traditional economic theories were unable to explain America’s 
racial divide in income categories, Loury turned to social 
capital.  Early on, he defined social capital mainly as 
intergenerational mobility and strength of inheritance.  
Embedded within this work is the observation that African-
Americans experiencing poverty and disenfranchisement have 
traditionally been deficient in the qualities that comprise 
social capital.  Of particular importance here are the social 
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linkages or “bridges” to resources in social settings normally 
inaccessible to African American audiences; such bridges provide 
crucial knowledge of and access to employment opportunities 
(Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo 2008).  In A Dynamic Theory of 
Racial Income Differences (Loury 1976; Portes 1998), Loury cites 
differential access to social connections for minorities and 
nonminority youth as a critical component to how racialized 
income inequality functions. 
While not exclusively a scholar in social capital, Loury 
would expound upon the subject in later years.  In a 1985 issue 
of Black Enterprise magazine, he defined social capital as the 
set of social institutions that inhere in family relations and 
community social organizations, and are useful in generating 
economic benefits by affecting the cognitive and social 
development of individual actors in a given social setting 
(Loury 1985).  These resources can constitute an important 
advantage for children and adolescents in the development of 
their human capital, and thus improve employment prospects and 
wage-earning potential. 
Under Loury’s (1985) perspective, social capital is also 
considered to be those social relationships that come into 
existence when individuals attempt to make the best use of their 
personal resources. He has argued these resources need not be 
seen solely as components of social structure, but also as 
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resources for the individual within said structure.  As a 
precursor to more recent social capital scholarship, Loury’s 
contributions were particularly influential to one of the most 
prominent voices on social capital in recent history: American 
sociologist James Coleman. 
In Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital (Coleman 
1988) and Foundations of Social Theory (Coleman 1990), Coleman 
sought to expand upon Loury’s original work by arguing that 
social capital is a multidimensional concept. In Coleman’s 
perspective, social capital exists in three basic forms.  The 
first is the combination of established obligations, 
expectations, and trustworthiness.  Collectively, these are 
common source for producing social credits and debts useful in 
mobilizing community residents to action.  Second is information 
channels; more specifically, social ties capable of producing or 
enhancing information and goal attainment. Coleman argued that 
the third form of social capital is established norms and 
sanctions of behavior supported by neighborhood residents, which 
also undergird effective social control (Coleman 1988; Coleman 
1990; White 2006). These forms of social capital share the 
quality of being linked to social structure and capable of 
inciting specific actions from individuals within said structure 
(Coleman 1990; Portes 1998). Coleman further emphasized the 
importance of closure, or the presence of enough social ties 
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between actors to guarantee norm observance, in his 
conceptualization of social capital (Coleman 1990). 
Widely considered responsible for reaffirming social 
capital’s relevance in contemporary social science discourse, 
Coleman made an indelible impression upon numerous scholars to 
follow.  Arguably the most prominent voice among them is 
American social and political philosopher Robert Putnam, whose 
description of American civic life drew significant and 
widespread attention to the concept of social capital. 
As one of the most resonant voices in contemporary social 
capital theory today, Putnam defines the concept as the 
connections between and across groups of social actors that 
facilitate survival and/or advancement within social settings, 
along with the norms of generalized trust, reciprocity, and 
collective action that arise from such connections (Putnam 
2000).  According to Putnam, social capital usually manifests 
itself as either social bonds or social bridges.  Bonding social 
capital refers to those ties between members of the same social 
group that lead to more exclusive connections amongst relatively 
homogenous groups such as family members, close friends, and 
fraternal/sororal members. 
Social bridges, on the other hand, unite individuals from 
separate enclaves.  Bridging social capital, therefore, is a 
product of the social connections that crosscut internal 
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networks to connect members of different non-familial groups 
(Beyerlein and Hipp 2005; Putnam 2000).  The connections formed 
through social capital bridges tend to be weaker than those 
found under bonding social capital.  They are more diverse, 
however, and conducive towards social advancement or “getting 
ahead” – a la Granovetter’s “weak ties” thesis (Granovetter 
1973) – than those formed under bonding social capital. These 
tend to be stronger but less accommodating to heterogeneity 
between individuals and groups (Beyerlein and Hipp 2005). 
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti’s (1993) earliest research 
into the civic traditions of residential communities in Italy 
and their impact on the effectiveness of democracy is considered 
a benchmark in social capital theory development.  In that 
research, they concluded that those communities most 
demonstrative of the democratic ethos were also the ones most 
populated with citizens high in social capital.  Here, social 
capital was represented via higher frequencies of meaningful 
social interactions, shared norms, and networks useful in 
resolving conflicts.  It is a position he would revisit several 
times more in subsequent analyses, of which the most prominent 
is his turn-of-the-century opus on the status of civic life in 
America, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community (Putnam 2000). 
Bowling Alone synthesized Putnam’s hypothesis that the 
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stability of residential community life in America has suffered 
on numerous fronts due to declines in social capital.  Marked 
decreases in voter participation, activity in professional 
organizations, volunteerism, social trust, altruism, and 
religious activity stand prominent among the supporting evidence 
he offered.  Putnam also remarked in subsequent analysis that 
social capital does vary with wealth and prosperity.  Poorer 
communities found in predominantly urban settings are 
disproportionately more deficient in social capital.  He also 
argued that as a result there are negative outcomes like crime 
and violence. 
Putnam’s suppositions have sparked considerable debate and 
criticism.  Particularly contested has been his interpretation 
of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, a seminal piece 
of observational literature undergirding the main hypotheses 
expounded in Bowling Alone.  DeFilippis (2001) argued Putnam 
erroneously diminishes the complexity of de Tocqueville’s 
original thesis by conflating civil society with social capital 
on the grounds that social capital is comprised of the norms and 
networks of civil society that lubricate cooperative action 
among both citizens and their institutions.  DeFilippis (2001) 
also maintained Putnam narrowly presents social capital as a 
primarily positive concept enabling people to act towards mutual 
goals fostered through trust and shared norms.  It is true, 
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according to DeFilippis (2001), that the propensity of Americans 
to develop trust networks and volunteer their time to support 
civic leagues and other local social organizations was a staple 
of America’s culture at the time of de Tocqueville’s analysis.  
de Tocqueville also believed, however, that civil society was 
only one of a number of factors defining America’s democratic 
and social identity – a controversial one at that.  Thus, 
isolating it as Putnam does for the sake of supporting his 
stance on social capital is perceived by DeFilippis and fellow 
scholars as highly selective and myopic (DeFilippis 2001; Foley 
and Edwards 1997). 
Moreover, Putnam is said to adhere to a somewhat antiquated, 
oversimplified notion of organizational participation wherein it 
is thought that people voluntarily join associations mainly to 
pursue common objectives.  DeFilippis argues that this notion 
enables Putnam to compare in equal light everything from trade 
unions to PTAs to bowling leagues when discussing where social 
capital stems from and why it is dropping (DeFilippis 2001).  
Here again, an important objection garners some attention. 
In the advent of major societal changes across the U.S. 
wrought by Industrialism and Post-Industrialism (e.g., greater 
complexity in social classes, disparities in income and 
institutional power), present-day voluntary associations are not 
nearly so homogenous in the goals of their members nor in their 
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effect on communities as to justify conceptualizing them all 
together (DeFilippis 2001).  Instead, DeFilippis (2001) states 
that access to social capital and related benefits members may 
reap are differentially skewed towards those organizations and 
networks higher in social status and/or wielding greater power 
(i.e., access to resources deemed vital for the organization’s 
existence).  While quick to identify the importance of voluntary 
associations and activity in the formulation of social capital, 
DeFilippis (2001) argues that Putnam offers far less insight 
into the influence of class and power in the existence of such 
organizations. 
Other criticisms levied against Putnam’s assessment of 
social capital in America include a lack of consideration for 
alternative forms of networking and civic engagement (DeFilippis 
2001; Portes 1998; Portes and Landholt 1996).  Putnam has been 
cited for adhering to a biased view that economically depressed, 
inner-city neighborhoods are deficient in producing social 
capital (DeFilippis 2001; Portes 1998; Portes and Landholt 
1996).  He is also cited for failing to account for a number of 
idiosyncrasies in relationship development and interaction that 
– while not necessarily captured under his definition of social 
capital – are nonetheless illustrative of the concept 
(DeFilippis 2001).  Ethnographic research from Elijah Anderson 
(2007 (1994)) supports the notion that, rather than an outright 
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lack of social capital, relationships amongst residents in 
impoverished ghetto neighborhoods result in forms of social 
capital not easily measured by self-reports of trust or 
participation in voluntary social organizations. 
The critiques of social capital stemming from such work as 
Putnam’s can be delineated into three broad areas. First, the 
concept “social capital” is defined differently across different 
theorists.  As demonstrated from the earliest origins with 
Hanifan, each of the preeminent scholars of the concept offers a 
unique perspective.  While some theorists define social capital 
as the process of developing resources into social ties, others 
say it is better understood by the results of such processes.  
There are also scholars that would contend it is best 
conceptualized as both the process and the results. 
Secondly, it is not always easy to identify where social 
capital resides and thirdly, nor is it easy to determine its 
causes.  While Loury, Bourdieu, and Coleman all concluded social 
capital is embedded in relationships, Putnam has staunchly 
defined it is a commodity residing in individuals (DeFilippis 
2001; Portes 1998; Portes and Landholt 1996).  He has further 
argued it is a commodity that can publicly or privately held 
(DeFilippis 2001; Putnam 2000).  In some respects, this 
conceptual ambiguity has been attributed to a flaw in Coleman’s 
initial reintroduction of the term.  In that work, social 
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capital is simultaneously defined as a mechanism, thing, and/or 
an outcome (DeFilippis, 2001; Portes, 1998). 
 
DEFINING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURAL CAUSES 
Given the various criticisms of social capital in both 
theory and application, it is important before proceeding to 
clarify the definition and causes of social capital to be used 
in this research.  Similar to Bourdieu’s perspective, the 
definition of social capital preferred for this study emphasizes 
two elements.  The first is the connections between people.  The 
second is the impact of these connections, including the 
mutually embraced norms created through such bonds and the 
informal sanctions levied against behaviors that threaten to 
undermine those bonds (Cancino 2005; Coleman 1990; Halpern 2005; 
Putnam 2000).  As with other forms of capital (i.e., human, 
financial), this definition also acknowledges social capital can 
grow through investment, be spent wisely or carelessly, be 
applied to the benefit or detriment of another's cache of 
resources, or enhanced when combined with other forms of capital 
(Burt 1992). 
Several more scholars have recognized that social capital is 
difficult to pin down to a single indicator, and thus have 
tended to favor definitions that aggregate several known 
components (Forrest and Kearns 2001; Grootaert 2006; Lederman, 
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Loayza, and Menendez 2001; Research 2000b; Stone 2001).  
Noteworthy among such efforts to operationalize social capital 
is the Social Capital Community Benchmark, or SCCB (Research, 
2000).  This work presents social capital as an amalgamation of 
social trust, racial trust, civic participation, friendship 
network diversity, group involvement (formal and informal), 
faith-based social capital, organized group interactions and 
informal social activity.  Easily among the largest recognized 
analyses of social capital, few other studies match the SCCB in 
breadth of factors tested.  Several subsequent studies confirm 
the relevance of factors initially vetted through the SCCB as 
benchmark social capital measures (Brown and Ferris 2007; de 
Souza Briggs 2007; Subramanian, Kim, and Kawachi 2002; Thoresen 
and Harris 2002; Uslaner 1999; Uslaner 2002). 
For instance, the World Bank surmised social capital to be 
the product of six dimensions – groups/networks, 
trust/solidarity, collective action/cooperation, 
information/communication, social cohesion/inclusion, and 
empowerment/political action (Grootaert, Narayan, Jones, and 
Woolcock 2004) – similar to variables presented in the SCCB.  
Stone (2001) posited a similar framework of network 
characteristics that featured trust norms and reciprocity.  
Forrest and Kearns (2001) offered a dynamic layout of social 
capital dimensions that included trust, supportive reciprocal 
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networks, and associational activity towards common purpose.  
Across these studies, three key components tend to encompass 
social capital above all others: trust, informal friendship 
connections, and organizational participation (Cancino 2005; 
Grootaert 2006; Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004; Rosenfeld, 
Messner, and Baumer 2001; Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999; 
Stone 2001; Woolcock 2001; Woolcock 2010).  More specifically, a 
functional, generalizable definition of social capital 
incorporates the informal social connections stemming from local 
friendship networks, attitudes such as trust that hold the 
networks together, and the resources and action that arise from 
the networks (i.e., diverse, structured organizational 
activity). 
For instance, informal friendship networks and the social 
bonds that bind them together hold a significant place in the 
traditions of civic life and identity of American communities 
(Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Putnam 2000).  A well-structured 
system of friends has long served as a main conduit towards 
social capital in the U.S., and data from the Social Capital 
Index – a proprietary aggregate measure of social capital 
derived by Putnam and his colleagues – reveals that many people 
who score high the measure tend to socialize more often with 
friends (Putnam 2000).  Bonds between friends tend to endure 
across both urban and rural settings, and thus the frequency and 
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breadth of visitations with friends stands as a popular measure 
of social capital (Putnam 2000). 
Concerning criminal activity and deviance on the whole, the 
relevance of quality friendship connections is documented in the 
seminal literature from Sampson and Groves (1989) on systemic 
models of neighborhood crime.  Their research maintains that 
informal friendship bonds are the most basic form of social 
connections constituting a community’s relationship 
infrastructure, and are a key resource for residents in exacting 
internal social control over deviance (Sampson and Groves 1989).  
Consequently, systemic theories of crime contend that when 
residents of a community form strong local ties by way of these 
friendship networks, social control within the community is 
enhanced. There is an increased capacity to recognize strangers 
and create additional structural constraints on deviant behavior 
and other sources of predatory victimization (Sampson and Groves 
1989). 
Building from the original social disorganization model 
(Shaw and McKay 1942, 1949), and with important clarification 
added by Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) on the significance of 
friendship bonds, Sampson and Groves (1989) found friendship 
networks had the second largest effect on burglary, and the 
extent of friendship ties in a community inversely correlated 
with street robbery, burglary, and total victimization.  
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Conversely, communities characterized by sparse friendship 
networks, along with unsupervised teenage peer groups and low 
organizational participation, held disproportionately higher 
rates of crime and delinquency in their research (Sampson and 
Groves 1989).  In sum, to the extent that residents in a 
community develop close friendships with fellow neighbors, they 
can be said to possess social capital. 
Along with friendship ties, trust is a frequently cited 
component of social capital (Cancino 2005; Portes 1998; White 
2006).  It is the main attitudinal component of social capital 
and regarded by some to be its most predictive factor (Neal 
2011).  Trust reduces the transaction costs associated with 
volunteerism and minimizes the number of resources required to 
ensure alignment between the behavior of individuals and groups 
within a community and the community’s best interests (Putnam 
2000; Uslaner 1999).  The attention to common interests and 
community welfare corresponding with social capital develops 
when trust is generalized in such a way as to allow people in a 
community to perceive that fellow residents hold values and 
behavioral standards similar to their own, and will tend to act 
in the community’s best interests (Coleman 1990; Jung 2003; 
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Vermeij 2007; Wollebek and 
Selle 2007). 
Finally, there is collective organizational participation – 
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a third commonly recognized feature of social capital.  It is 
thought that such activity does not flourish if trust is non-
existent (Coleman 1990; Fukuyama 2001; Putnam 1993; Taylor 1997; 
Vermeij 2007).  The conclusion then has been that trust produces 
an environment conducive for collective action (Putnam 1993; 
Putnam 2000; Putnam 2002).   
Yet, it has also been argued conversely that widespread 
trust, friendship networks, and the ensuing social norms 
enabling collective community efforts are often learned and 
strengthened through memberships and participation in voluntary 
organizations like church groups, labor unions and parent-
teacher associations (Jung 2003; Putnam 2000; Putnam 2002; 
Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Vermeij 2007).  This is 
true, particularly when such activity generates positive, 
tangible outcomes like reduced deviance and crime.  In short, it 
may be the case that collective organizational participation 
breeds trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Jung 2003), and perhaps 
proximally more extensive networks of friends. 
Ultimately, whether collective organizational participation 
is a cause or a consequence of the friendships and trust 
defining social capital is left unresolved in the literature. 
Scholars do not seem perturbed by the directional uncertainty 
here either, as little effort has been made to address it.  
However, what is clear is that when collective organizational 
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participation thrives it embodies the resources and actions that 
produce “good” social capital (Dowla 2006; Grootaert 2006; 
Narayan and Pritchett 1999) within high trust, network-dense 
communities. 
Social capital then is clearly defined by friendship 
networks, attitudes like trust that bond members of a network, 
and the resulting collective resources and actions.  But, what 
of its structural causes?  There is lesser discussion in the 
extant literature, and considerable bifurcation in theoretical 
perspectives when it is discussed.  Four area structural factors 
are commonly identified as keys to understanding the 
development, or lack thereof, of social capital: economic 
status, ethnic heterogeneity, residential stability, and 
population density. 
Economic status, and poverty status in particular, is 
prominent in discourse on the causes of social capital.  
Scholars identify status deficiencies like low household income 
and unemployment in a community as among the more disruptive 
variables to social capital development.  The daily hardships 
encountered in pursuit of basic necessities when financial means 
are lacking drains residents of the will and energy to invest in 
social trust and civic activism (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 
1997; White 2006).  The urban poor are especially challenged in 
developing social capital as a resource for addressing issues 
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like crime victimization (Williamson, Ashby, and Webber 2006). 
However, social capital is also among the commodities that 
help poorer households mitigate the effects of resource 
deprivation. It can provide alternative means of “getting by or 
getting ahead” in the absence of other useful commodities 
(Putnam 2000).  Research predating Coleman’s confirmed 
reciprocal social networks are vital for the urban poor to cope 
with hardships in their lives (Perlman 2006).  Among residents 
of poverty-stricken Roma communities, networks imbued with 
social capital have proven vital in the decision for Roma to 
migrate (Pantea 2013).  Geleta (2014) notes how in certain 
communities poorer individuals rely heavily on social capital-
based credit as an alternative means of financial exchange. 
Social capital literature further shows that the extent of 
ethnic heterogeneity in a community is important for social 
capital.  Increasingly diverse ethnic communities tend to be 
associated with decreasing caches of social capital (Briggs 
2010; Putnam 1993), which is argued to be at least partially 
attributable to a lack of trust.  Individuals and groups within 
ethnically diverse communities experience more obstacles in 
discovering common values and behavioral norms that would 
engender such trust (Collier 1998; Knack and Keefer 1997).  
Conversely, greater ethnic homogeneity is thought to minimize 
trust barriers and ease the path towards reaching common ground 
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among fellow community members, which ultimately stimulates 
social capital. 
Yet, there are again conflicting theoretical perspectives 
here.  While ethnic heterogeneity is widely viewed as correlated 
with social capital, whether it increases or decreases social 
capital is debated.  In fact, when levels of civil unrest and 
rebellious activity are used as indicators of social capital, 
Collier (1998) maintains both outcomes are possible.  He 
specifies that among disaffected ethnic groups in African 
countries, the diversity across these groups can stimulate 
social capital via organizational activity necessary for civil 
rebellion. This occurs when such diversity is moderate and 
government disapproval among the groups is largely congruent.  
However, as the number of dissatisfied ethnic groups swell, 
coordination of rebellious activity becomes increasingly 
difficult and thus the increased diversity results in a 
diminishing capacity for such capital to develop (Collier 1998). 
Where residential stability/mobility is concerned, social 
capital is widely seen to benefit from stability in a 
community’s population. The importance of such stability to 
social capital is explained by Putnam (1995) in his “repotting 
hypothesis”.  Here he argues root systems undergirding social 
networks in a community take time to develop much in the same 
way strong roots in a plant need time to mature. Constant flux 
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in neighborhood population results in a disruption of these root 
systems at the expense of social capital, and particularly civic 
engagement (Putnam 1995).  This observation is echoed by other 
scholars (Temkin and Rohe 1998; Warner and Rountree 1997; White 
2006). 
In determining causes of social capital, population density 
factors into the mix given how vital resources like food, 
shelter, and education are differentially distributed in most 
stratified social settings (Massey 2007).  A number of 
perspectives maintain that as population density increases, so 
too does demand for and subsequent depletion of such resources 
(Cho and McLeod 2007; Durkheim 2008 (1893); Ladbrook 1988).  
Consequently, higher density results in more groups contending 
for greater power and access to resources, with a result of more 
opportunities for social capital via interaction and 
participation recruiting (Cho and McLeod 2007). 
The competition for resources characteristic of high-density 
neighborhoods can foster exclusionary practices.  Residents in 
such communities can rally together in the effort to either 
unfairly deny others access to these resources (e.g., racial 
exclusion in prosperous housing markets) or otherwise position 
themselves more favorably to acquire them (DeFilippis 2001).  
This hyper-competitive environment also breeds a certain brand 
of individualism in disposition and behavior, and thus helps 
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clarify why urban dwellers interact less and seemingly generate 
less social capital (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).  
Such “downside outcomes” to social capital exposes how 
population density has equal propensity to foster divisive and 
inclusive versions of social capital, as well as how the 
benefits of social capital are tied to power-laden institutions 
and advantaged individuals/groups more so in high density urban 
areas (DeFilippis 2001). 
Having now reviewed the history and more recent development 
of social capital theory, as well as established a working 
definition of social capital that acknowledges some of its more 
prominent causes, the next section examines one possible 
consequence when social capital is lacking – neighborhood crime.  
Beyond the literature on social capital itself, this discussion 
draws heavily on two criminological theories – social 
disorganization and collective efficacy – whose core precepts 
bear a striking similarity to those found in social capital 
theory. 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CRIME 
Central to this dissertation are the premises that criminal 
activity in a community is linked to the level of social capital 
within it, and that crime is generally lower in communities with 
larger caches of social capital.  But, how exactly does social 
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capital reduce crime?  While there is plenty of evidence that 
social capital reduces crime, theoretical explanations for these 
observations has not always been so apparent.  When efforts have 
been made to explain the connection, emphasis has tended to 
focus on the nature, quality and density of social networks. 
For instance, according to Putnam (2000), social networks 
form the infrastructure of social capital.  Thus, when those 
networks are weak, social capital is weak; when they are strong, 
social capital thrives (Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004; 
Putnam 2000).  In turn, social capital’s capacity to reduce 
crime is commensurate with the strength of social networks.  
Network-rich communities are more adept at reducing crime 
through exertion of social control (especially over young 
people) in the community (Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004; 
Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001). 
It is specifically the networks related to bridging social 
capital that tend to lower crime, however.  Bridging social 
capital is a product of volunteerism within communities and 
efforts to reach beyond the immediate community’s borders to 
form alliances with groups and institutions in more distant 
locales (Akcomak and Weel 2011; Cancino 2005).  These efforts 
result more often in an expansion and enhancement of a 
community’s social network system.  In turn, crime reduction 
efforts are expanded because these network lines tend to funnel 
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in knowledge and resources from more distant communities, such 
as best practices in crime reduction efforts.  Extended lines of 
trust are also fostered through bridging social capital, and 
trust is vital to safer, stable communities. 
For instance, the inclination of residents in a community to 
support bridged networks by looking out for the welfare of 
residents in distant neighborhoods along with their own is 
bolstered when there is trust that those distant residents are 
reciprocating such concern (Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 
2001).  With the broadened trust that is forged from such 
cohesive social bridges, there is an increase in radii of 
surveillance, citizen participation with formal law enforcement, 
and heightened risk for offenders of being caught.  Thus, trust 
across communities will tend to reduce crime by increasing the 
likelihood of identifying and arresting offenders (Akcomak and 
Weel 2011; Sampson 1988). 
Additionally, social capital increases the likelihood of 
arrest and the costs of committing crime by enhancing mechanisms 
of informal social control and civic engagement (Akcomak and 
Weel 2011).  Particularly concerning the latter, civic 
engagement is cited as a dimension of social capital (Akcomak 
and Weel 2011; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004), and 
civically engaged citizens are more inclined to look out for the 
safety and comfort of their neighbors.  They are more likely to 
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look after one another’s children and property, and feel 
comfortable in calling upon fellow neighbors to do the same.  
For at least these reasons, community residents perceive social 
capital as valuable and those possessing and willing to offer it 
develop a positive reputation and gain acceptance within their 
community (Akcomak and Weel 2011).  Consequently, social capital 
further reduces crime by discouraging residents within such 
communities from committing crime at the risk of losing their 
own cache of social capital and the aforementioned benefits that 
come with it (Akcomak and Weel 2011). 
Liu’s (2005) research into prisoner reentry highlights yet 
another way in which social capital reduces crime.  Social 
capital is largely defined by way of the presence and integrity 
of cohesive social networks, as well as the deeply embedded 
trust underlying such networks.  Both are invaluable resources 
to an ex-offender seeking reintegration back into a law-abiding 
collective.  This is because, conjointly, these resources 
undergird a conduit between ex-offenders and legitimate social 
activities like steady employment, education attainment, and 
marriage that help build or rebuild the trust of the community. 
The rationale for the importance of a community’s trust is 
that citizens typically need trust to warrant reaching out to 
ex-offenders.  As citizens gain trust that an ex-offender has 
been sufficiently punished for his/her transgression(s) and is 
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sincere about wanting to reintegrate into the community, they 
will be more inclined to support ex-offenders’ efforts to enter 
legitimate social institutions by extending their own 
connections to such reforming criminals.  A community’s 
residents are also more likely to support ex-offenders if the 
ex-offenders’ families are trustworthy.  Such support may come 
by way of offering general life advice, or more specific 
examples such as insight on job opportunities, emotional support 
while reintegrating back to the community, and/or encouraging 
fellow residents to offer similar support. 
Steady work and family development represent stability and 
security in a neighborhood (Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves 
1989).  There are also notable recidivism-reducing effects of 
being connected to formal institutions like stable employment 
and marriage (Liu 2005).  Thus, access to the types of networks 
and trust that define social capital are vital towards lowering 
crime by helping to facilitate viable pathways for previous 
offenders to those institutions representative of a law-abiding 
lifestyle. 
Importantly, insight into how social capital impacts 
neighborhood crime does not draw exclusively from social capital 
literature nor does it always use the language of social capital 
(Beyerlein and Hipp 2005).  Early social disorganization models 
from Shaw and McKay (1942, 1949), as well as modern systemic 
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(Bursik 1999; Bursik and Grasmick 1992) and collective efficacy 
models (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997) impart important 
criminological theories of neighborhood crime.  All of them 
include many ideas and concepts similar to those found in the 
social capital literature.  In fact, Sampson, a major figure in 
both social disorganization and collective efficacy, has 
discussed social capital.  He writes “…lack of social capital is 
one of the primary features of socially disorganized 
neighborhoods” (Sampson 1992:78).  Any discussion then of the 
role of social capital in understanding neighborhood crime must 
include discussion of this extended literature. 
 
Social Disorganization   
The theory of social disorganization was developed from work 
done in Chicago.  It contends juvenile delinquency and other 
forms of deviance occur more often in communities where 
residents fail to realize common values and maintain control 
over their surroundings – thus, becoming socially disorganized 
(Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1942, 1949).  Factors 
predictive of social disorganization in the literature include 
low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and high residential 
mobility (Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1942, 1949).  
Communities high in these factors are marked by anonymity among 
neighbors, sparse local organizations, and young people 
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disconnected from adult supervision (Amato 1993; Anderson 2007 
(1994); Bursik 1999; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Wirth 1938). 
With these qualities present, socially disorganized 
communities lack the capacity to engineer the types of social 
ties and norms proven to assist in regulating negative behavior 
and resolving problems between residents (Bursik 1999; Bursik 
and Grasmick 1993).  Chief elements of social capital like trust 
and civic engagement are closely aligned with well-organized 
neighborhoods (Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001), and thus it 
should be expected that lower levels of such attributes also 
characterize socially disorganized residential settings.  Lower 
civic engagement undermines the development of interpersonal 
connections that foster informal social control useful in 
preventing criminal and violent behavior(Rosenfeld, Messner, and 
Baumer 2001).  Similarly, trust is argued to be critical in 
maintaining the type of informal social connections that lead to 
a civically engaged populace capable of effective social 
organization and thus better management of crime rates 
(Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001; Sampson, Morenoff, and 
Earls 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). 
Albeit popular as a framework for community crime analyses, 
Shaw and McKay’s original social disorganization model garnered 
its share of criticisms.  Included among them was an 
overreliance on past crime data from official records and the 
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inappropriateness of using Census data to address effects 
between community structure and crime (Sampson and Groves 1989).  
Their work has also been cited for its inability to test the 
theory beyond the effects of median income, racial composition, 
and residential mobility due to limitations in the available 
data (Sampson and Groves 1989).  Further noted was the inability 
of the original model to separate social disorganization’s 
causes from its consequences (Sampson and Groves 1989). 
In light of these criticisms, a number of contemporary 
scholars sought to improve upon the Shaw and McKay model.  
Noteworthy among these revisionists were Robert Sampson and W. 
Byron Groves (1989).  They drew from the systemic model of 
Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) which contends length of residence 
is the “key exogenous factor influencing community behavior and 
attitude”.  They further stated that “the major intervening 
variables are friendship and kinship bonds and formal and 
informal associational ties within the local community” (Kasarda 
and Janowitz 1974:330).  In attempting to clarify the concept of 
social disorganization and separate it from its causes and its 
effect, Sampson and Groves argued that organization can be found 
in a community’s local friendship networks, participation in 
local organizations, and management of unsupervised youth 
(informal social control).  In turn, as demonstrated in Figure 
1, broken or missing friendship networks, unsupervised teens and 
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low organizational participation lead to higher rates of crime:  
 
 
Figure 1. Sampson and Groves’ Model of Social Disorganization 
 
           
  
Importantly, they also discussed the factors that led to 
social disorganization.  Economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, 
and residential stability were key as argued in earlier work.  
They also included urbanization – identified and dummy-coded as 
communities located in central-city locations – with the 
hypothesis that urbanization weakens local kinship and 
friendship networks and impedes participation in local affairs. 
 
Collective Efficacy  
Sampson’s original attempt with Groves to refine Shaw and 
McKay’s model also had its share of flaws.  For instance, it has 
been noted for low variance explained as well as limitations in 
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number and operationalization of community organization 
variables.  In addition, the dubiousness of the organizational 
participation measure employed was also cited. 
Noting these flaws, Sampson sought to advance social 
disorganization theory and earlier efforts to improve it as one 
of the chief architects of collective efficacy.  Sharing quite a 
bit in common conceptually with social capital (Cancino 2005), 
collective efficacy theory offers insight into many of the same 
pathways that connect social capital to crime.  Collective 
efficacy is defined as the presence of interpersonal social 
cohesion among neighbors and willingness to intervene on behalf 
of the common good (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997). 
Sampson and colleagues (1997) contend increases in 
collective efficacy lead to less crime.  The theory further 
states that much of the variation in collective efficacy is 
attributable to residential stability (homeownership + 
residential tenure), concentrated disadvantage (poverty + 
resource deprivation), and ethnic heterogeneity (racial 
diversity + segmentation).  Accordingly, collective efficacy 
within a community decreases with concentrated disadvantage and 
increases when residential stability is high.  Ultimately, it 
mediates the relationships neighborhood disadvantage and 
residential instability maintain with interpersonal violence. 
Implicit within the theory is the notion that in communities 
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where residents own and maintain homes, a desire to protect the 
value of such property and maintain social control in the 
surrounding community is cultivated, as are beliefs that fellow 
neighbors should behave similarly.  In this way, a communal 
understanding between residents is fostered in which trust and 
civic reciprocity become valued commodities.  Social unity is 
fortified under such conditions, as residents collectively 
conclude that crime and other forms of social disorder are 
detrimental to the community’s prosperity.  Through socially-
sanctioned community investments, residents become more trusting 
of fellow neighbors and more inclined to act to uphold positive 
behavioral norms. 
The kind of social trust and reciprocal norms embedded 
within collective efficacy take time to mature.  As White (2006) 
articulated, the development of ties may require time spent with 
neighbors in such endeavors as helping neighbors work on their 
cars, supervising children or watching over their property when 
they are away.  Thus, the longer residents live and invest in 
their communities (the higher residential stability is), the 
stronger and more expansive collective efficacy is expected to 
be.  Conversely, resource deprivation by way of limited 
educational opportunities, inequities in political 
representation and employment scarcity robs a community of 
assets conducive to developing collective efficacy.  
!!
42 
Concentrated disadvantage, in conjunction with weak collective 
efficacy produces neighborhood crime and disorder (White 2006). 
Thus far the discussion has centered around the role that 
social capital, and the related concept of collective efficacy 
have in reducing neighborhood rates of crime.  Before concluding 
a discussion of the role of social capital in neighborhood crime 
however acknowledgement should be made of the possibility that 
an individual’s or neighborhood’s social capital could be used 
to increase crime.  There is some thought that criminals vary in 
their capacity to succeed in illicit enterprises based upon the 
breadth and quality of their social collaborations with 
lucrative offenders (Nguyen and Bouchard 2013).  Not all 
offenders are equally capable of forging and maintaining such 
connections.  Those who are usually achieve greater prosperity 
in crime precisely because they can leverage those networks into 
resources like knowledge about new illicit opportunities, 
strategies for avoiding incarceration, and general social 
support/encouragement of their involvement in criminal endeavors 
(Burt 2000; Hansen 1995; Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez 2001; 
McCarthy and Hagan 2001; Nguyen and Bouchard 2013). 
Some scholars have argued social capital – even just the 
capacity for producing it – tends to increase exponentially with 
the size of an offender’s networks.  The chances for prosperity 
in illicit behavior grow then as their networks grow (McCarthy 
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and Hagan 2001; Nguyen and Bouchard 2013).  Furthermore, where 
violent criminals are active participants with law-abiding 
citizens in the types of exchanges that produce and/or are 
produced by social capital, the influence of such criminal 
elements may result in propensity for further violent offending 
within the community (Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez 2001).  
When tightly bonded, these community members may also become 
prone to perceive criminal behavior (violent or otherwise) as a 
necessary means of goal achievement, offer protection for 
criminals and possibly even revere some law-breaking behavior as 
aspirational (Lederman, Loayza, and Menendez 2001).  
Distinguishing between social capital and collective 
efficacy.  Throughout the literature, a common perception is 
that social capital and collective efficacy are very similar.  
Given the similarity in their basic components and precepts, it 
can be difficult to distinguish between them.  In fact, White 
(2006) posits that social capital is collective efficacy.  More 
specifically, collective efficacy entails positive social 
capital via relationships forged through strong cohesion and 
trust between neighbors (White 2006). 
Further implied throughout the literature is the notion that 
social capital and collective efficacy similarly aid in 
minimizing both minor incivilities and more serious disruptions 
of civic order.  The two constructs are unified by an emphasis 
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on social cohesiveness and trustworthiness between neighbors as 
key components of safe and stable communities.  Also shared is 
the belief that such attributes generally strengthen and are 
strengthened by a commitment to mutually beneficial exchanges 
between neighbors over time.  However, for all their 
similarities, social capital and collective efficacy are 
distinguishable from each other with respect to their effects on 
criminal and other disorderly conduct. 
Social capital refers to the potential resources derived 
from social networks cohering a community’s residents that are 
available to address disorder in the community (Brehm and Rahn 
1997; Cancino 2005; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).  
Collective efficacy is regarded as the application of specific 
resources like trust and willingness to intervene in order to 
address such disorder and related social ills (Cancino 2005; 
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997).  The latter is an outcome 
in communities where social capital is abundant (Cancino 2005; 
Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; White 2006).  This is 
especially so when the social bonds symbolic of social capital 
allow for the process of turning those bonds into desired 
outcomes (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001). 
While in theory a community could possess social capital 
without necessarily producing collective efficacy, the latter is 
unlikely to exist without the prerequisite social capital needed 
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to spark it.  The relationship then between social capital and 
collective efficacy is not unlike that which is found in physics 
between potential and kinetic forces of energy.  In this case, 
social capital serves as the potential force available for 
communities to address crime and social disorder; collective 
efficacy is the kinetic force that is the efforts made to reduce 
crime and disorder when the potential force of social capital is 
activated. 
 
Social Capital, Crime and the Rural-Urban Divide 
Much of the work on social capital, and the equally 
compelling research on social disorganization and collective 
efficacy, stems from scholars based in Western industrialized 
nations largely centered in the U.S.  As a consequence, their 
foci has typically overlooked rural communities.  The lesser 
focus on rural spaces in both general ecological literature on 
crime and that which specifically incorporates social capital 
suggests that either rural areas are not as prone to crime as 
urban areas, or that it is justifiable to simply take what has 
been learned in urban settings and apply them directly to their 
rural counterparts.  But is this treatment of rural communities 
acceptable?  Or is there a divide between urban and rural crime 
phenomena that requires more attention to rural communities? 
In fact, a fair amount of literature contends the latter; 
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rural communities exhibit rates of criminal activity similar to 
urban neighborhoods, and in certain instances more so.  Over 
half of the 30 U.S. counties with the highest homicide rates are 
categorized as nonmetropolitan (Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 
2006).  In addition, amphetamine and cocaine usage are no less 
than 50% more likely among rural youth compared to urban youth 
(Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006).  Finally, access to drug 
treatment centers is often more problematic in rural 
neighborhoods due to greater distances and public transportation 
limitations (Weisheit and Donnermeyer 2000; Weisheit, Falcone, 
and Wells 2006).  Internationally, we find that juvenile 
delinquency among boys in Portugal is largely consistent between 
urban and rural settings across 11 measured delinquent acts 
(Cardoso, Perista, Carrilho, and Silva 2013), and data on 
suicide in Australia reveals that nearly 45% of all suicides 
among men between 1990 and 2008 were from rural residents 
(McPhedran and Leo 2013). 
Consider that smaller rural communities are characterized 
more with "bonding social capital" than larger urban communities 
due to the presence of rigid familial networks and friendship 
norms (Beggs, Haines, and Hurlbert 1996; Beggs, Hurlbert, and 
Haines 1996; Fischer 1995; Hofferth and Iceland 1998).  This 
type of social capital has also proven to correlate with higher 
rates of sexual assaults, incidents of domestic violence, and 
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homicides (Beyerlein and Hipp 2005; DeKeseredy et al. 2007).  
Particularly with domestic violence, heightened rural patriarchy 
and norms of rural life breed complicity to such crimes 
(DeKeseredy et al. 2007).  Rural communities have also been 
known to overlook or excuse the abuse of a domestic partner if 
the abuser is a member of one or more valued networks, if the 
abuse victim is excluded from such networks, or if the victim is 
considered to be of lower status compared to the abuser within 
those networks (DeKeseredy et al. 2007). 
Yet, despite such data, a number of myths and misperceptions 
about rural communities abound.  Consider that, when compared to 
urban neighborhoods, rural neighborhoods are thought to be more 
homogenous settings where residents are more likely to know each 
other’s affairs, interact with one another regularly, and share 
core sets of values (DeKeseredy et al. 2007; Websdale 1995).  
Where such presumptions of similarity and cohesion are in play, 
it is not much of a stretch to imagine some scholars concluding 
the effects of social interaction and cohesion are already well 
understood in rural communities.  Of course, even a cursory 
review of the current rural literature would reveal such 
presumptions are deeply flawed.  While rural neighborhoods may 
be relatively homogenous, rural communities are far from 
universally the same.  There are, in fact, numerous types of 
rural communities and each is distinguishable by such factors as 
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level of industrialization, trends in population shifts, and 
socioeconomic characteristics (DeKeseredy et al. 2007; Jobes, 
Barclay, Weinand, and Donnermeyer 2004). 
Be that as it may, the myth of homogeneity persists.  Thus, 
when national crime data (i.e., the FBI Uniform Crime Reports) 
routinely show urban crime rates as higher than rural crime 
rates, all or nearly all rural communities are believed to be 
relatively crime free (DeKeseredy et al. 2007).  Weisheit et al 
(2006) noted how many people assume crime rarely occurs in the 
rural U.S., and both mass media and crime literature greatly 
perpetuate this assumption (Donnermeyer, Jobes, and Barclay 
2006; Jones 1995; Lichter, Amundson, and Lichter 2003). 
Limited data collection and low consensus on findings, along 
with weaknesses in measurement validity and reliability stemming 
from disagreement over the conceptualization of rurality in 
criminological research(DeKeseredy et al. 2007; Donnermeyer, 
Jobes, and Barclay 2006; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006) adds 
to the confusion.  Social science has not often identified units 
of analyses in rural communities that match up with urban 
communities in such a way that would allow for comparable 
assessment of the effects of community crime models derived from 
social disorganization and social capital (Petee and Kowalski 
1993; Reisig and Cancino 2004).  Furthermore, while social 
interactions are important to quality of life in both urban and 
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rural communities, social science scholars have also had trouble 
discerning the processes through which social ties develop in 
the latter (Reisig and Cancino 2004).  This hampers 
comprehension of social phenomena like crime in rural settings. 
The argument for disentangling urban and rural communities 
in this discourse is strengthened when considering the 
structural and cultural nuances separating the two area types. 
For example, one school of thought stemming from Durkheimian 
literature is that urban communities are more prone to 
structural pressures conducive to law-breaking activity and a 
diminished capacity to restrain citizens from behaving deviantly 
(Durkheim 2008 (1893); Ladbrook 1988).  As Durkheim observed, 
the nature of urban life differs remarkably from rural living, 
and certain pressures on social life in large cities stem from a 
combination of forces commensurate with rapid industrialization 
in urban communities during the late 19th century and ever since.  
Chief among these forces are heightened individualism and 
diminished cohesion with neighbors resulting from greater 
competition for resources and hierarchical positioning of 
occupations (Durkheim 2008 (1893); Ladbrook 1988). 
Durkheim argues city dwellers tend to feel less connected to 
their fellow citizens under such conditions, viewing them more 
as obstacles towards success in the hyper-competitive 
environment associated with the newer industrial way of life 
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(Durkheim 2008 (1893); Ladbrook 1988).  Furthermore, compared to 
lower density rural areas, Durkheim says cities are governed 
more by what is morally correct at an individual level versus 
the moral good of the community.  Thus, interpretation of laws 
in urban communities are more likely to seek protection of 
individual rights, and the legal enforcement of social behavior 
is relegated almost exclusively to formal institutions. 
Indeed, the difference between urban and rural communities 
is vividly illustrated when considering evidence on the impact 
of structural factors like population density (Cho and McLeod 
2007; McCulloch 2003), residential stability (Putnam 1995; 
Putnam 2000), and poverty (Collier 1998; Halpern 2005) on 
neighborhood-level crime patterns.  Weisheit (2006) notes the 
enduring belief that while rural communities carry the capacity 
to enforce rules of conduct through informal measures, higher 
density urban communities have typically made such measures less 
practical.  Accordingly, formal measures of social control 
(i.e., law enforcement agencies, state-governed court systems) 
have become more relevant and relied upon to police urban areas.  
Ladbrook (1988) noted in these denser urban communities that the 
anonymity and social schism characteristic of such settings also 
allows for lower probability of detection for those engaging in 
criminal activity and less harm to one’s reputation as a result 
of such behavior. 
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Aside from high population density, another structural 
feature – the mobility of residents – has been a constant in 
major cities since the late 19th/early 20th centuries (Kasarda and 
Janowitz 1974; Wirth 1938).  Much of this activity is traceable 
back to the Industrial Revolution, where migrations away from 
rural communities into large and complex metropolitan 
neighborhoods were a frequent occurrence (Wirth, 1938).  The 
constant influx of jobseekers from non-urban locales both 
foreign and domestic into sprawling urban neighborhoods during 
this period often entailed an abandonment of preexisting ideals 
conducive to rural life. Shifts in favor of those more 
appropriate to city living such as social obligations shifting 
to individual rights and material values supplanting ancestral 
ones occurred.  Such transition was rarely easy, and in 
instances of failure to adopt urban ideals and practices, 
illicit alternative opportunities and behaviors often became 
more viable as a means for certain newcomers to cope (Ladbrook 
1988). 
Consideration of another structural component distinguishing 
urban and rural communities, poverty, is also necessary.  It 
reveals shifting residency trends among middle- and upper-income 
classes away from large dense cities, and the subsequent 
emergence of resource-deprived ghetto communities within these 
cities.  Particularly over the last 40 years, 
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deindustrialization trends endemic to large cities have spurred 
an exodus of employers and non-poor residents alike to suburban 
enclaves peripheral to large urban cities and foreign markets.  
Both of these are less accessible to those too poor and/or ill-
trained to maintain access to the newly-relocated employers and 
wealthier neighbors.  The aftermath in U.S. neighborhoods has 
been a clustering of low-income residents severely crippled by 
widespread unemployment, low education status, and frayed social 
bonds (Anderson 2007 (1994); Kasarda 1989; Sugrue 1993; Wilson 
1987; Wilson 1996). 
Coupled with drastically lowered volume of job opportunities 
suitable to low-skilled labor employment and compensation for 
such employment in more urban neighborhoods (Chaskin 1997; 
Kasarda 1989; Sugrue 1993), the chances for lower-class citizens 
to pursue legitimate means of goal achievement have reduced 
dramatically (Lee, Maume, and Ousey 2003).  Residents of these 
impoverished inner-city ghettoes have often found themselves 
drawn to criminal endeavors and/or other alternative acts of 
deviance to alleviate the effects of such concentrated poverty 
(Ohmer, Warner, and Beck 2010; Wilson 2009).  Yet, poverty is 
far from an exclusively metropolitan problem.  Coverage and 
discourse in ecological social literature tends to favor larger 
cities.  There is compelling evidence, however, that 
nonmetropolitan neighborhoods actually experience more damage 
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from neighborhood-scale poverty than metropolitan communities 
(Albrecht, Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000; Lichter and Eggebeen 
1992; Tolbert and Lyson 1992). 
Concerning the differences in cultural traits between urban 
and rural neighborhoods, the close-knit networks and exchanges 
with family and friends often associated with social capital are 
weighted more heavily in nonmetropolitan neighborhoods.  This is 
due largely to an enduring characteristic of wide dispersion 
between neighbors and kin in such communities, as well as the 
presence of certain distinctions of rural living.  Factors such 
as seasonal farming demands, less sophisticated road networks, 
and lack of public transportation make developing weaker social 
ties extending beyond those immediate connections less feasible 
(Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006).  This adherence to closer, 
more familiar networks is commensurate with a homogeneity in 
social life and disposition among neighbors in nonmetropolitan 
communities that lends itself to the bonding type of social 
capital (Crawford 2006).  On the other hand, the cohesion and 
homogenous way of living associated more with nonmetropolitan 
neighborhoods tends to break down in larger metropolitan 
communities.  This is also due to a combination of the emphasis 
on individualism over community orientation and structural 
pressures towards deviance (Crawford 2006; Putnam 2000).  
Typically comprised of more diverse population groupings as well 
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(Chaskin 1997; Wirth 1938), we should not expect to see the same 
type of social capital between urban and rural neighborhoods. 
Nevertheless, while the nature of social capital between 
urban and rural communities may differ, the concept is just as 
viable no matter which end of the urbanization spectrum a 
community occupies.  Acclaimed author and urban philosopher Jane 
Jacobs (1961) accentuated this point when discussing social 
capital.  She stated specifically that one staple of 
nonmetropolitan communities, homogeneity or “togetherness” (the 
notion that sharing anything among fellow residents means 
sharing much), is a divisive force in urban communities (Jacobs 
1961).  She argued it need not be highlighted as a pivotal 
element to defining social capital in these settings.  Jacobs’ 
challenges previous interpretations of social capital 
highlighting the development of civic virtue through 
neighborhood homogeneity and kinship ties.  Her contention was 
that neighbors need not be so similar along cultural or 
sociodemographic grounds for social cohesion to occur (Crawford 
2006; Jacobs 1961). 
This is not to say she devalued the role of social capital 
in creating safe communities; quite the contrary, Jacobs opined 
that social capital (or “togetherness”, as she put it) is what 
most differentiated safety in neighborhoods (Jacobs 1961).  
Rather, her position was that the natural development of 
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informal social connections – not demographic homogeneity or 
level of urbanization – was the vital building block to creating 
the sort of social capital necessary for mitigating most 
community safety and health concerns like crime (Jacobs 1961).  
For this reason, metropolitan residential models were just as 
viable to Jacobs as nonmetropolitan models in the creation and 
maintenance of social capital.  To her, urban communities were 
just as capable as rural or suburban neighborhoods of creating 
the neighborly connections necessary in sustaining such capital. 
In conclusion, the history of social capital research 
reveals a concept that is a hotly debated and multifaceted.  
Nonetheless, social capital is consistently defined by trust and 
friendship networks, as well as the activities and resources 
accruing from collective participation in local social 
organizations.  Numerous structural factors also influence both 
the presence and nature of social capital in a community – not 
the least of which are a community’s density, residential 
mobility of residents, ethnic diversity and concentration of 
poor people – and one phenomena profoundly affected by its 
presence or lack thereof in light of these factors is crime.  
Even when not studied strictly as “social capital”, informal 
social networks, trust and other enduring traits associated with 
social capital have proven relevant in congruent research from 
social disorganization and collective efficacy scholars. 
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Despite such gains in knowledge, theoretical advancement in 
social capital theory among crime scholars has been limited due 
to overemphasis in the empirical research on urban communities 
and overreliance upon data from neighborhoods in the US.  Both 
of these trends become even clearer in the next chapter, which 
offers a current state of this discourse by considering evidence 
of the differences between urban and rural communities with 
respect to social capital, its causes, its relationship to 
crime, and the geographic settings from which such evidence 
originates.  Particular attention is given to the evidence 
corroborating the relationship between social capital and crime 
in residential communities outside of the U.S., how scarce this 
evidence compares to U.S. data, and how the contextual effect of 
urbanization status in social capital literature is often 
ignored.  The latter only becoming slightly more clear once 
social disorganization and collective efficacy literature is 
accounted for.  The concludes with a statement of this 
dissertation’s hypotheses, derived from the key argument that 
differentiating between urban and rural communities matters in 
investigations and applications of social capital-crime models 
in foreign settings like the UK. 
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CHAPTER III  
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE  
In this chapter, a close examination of research on both the 
causes of social capital and social capital’s connection to 
neighborhood-level effects like crime reveals a variety of 
complex studies that occasionally contradict in findings.  It is 
also clear that these studies are remarkably skewed towards 
urban areas predominantly in the U.S., and often overlooks the 
contextual impact of urbanization.  Particularly concerning the 
effect of social capital on crime, while a fair amount of 
documentation stems from evidence outside of the U.S., such 
evidence is considerably limited when compared to data from 
American communities. Yet, there are indications that accounting 
for urbanization status more, and adding to the cadre of 
international studies would help clarify some of the confusion 
stemming from research into social capital’s causes and its 
effects on crime. 
 
CAUSES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN RURAL AND URBAN COMMUNITIES  
Within social capital literature, several cited and often 
debated causes are implicated in determining how much social 
capital a community has available.  One is residential 
stability, the length of residential tenure within a 
neighborhood and its level of population flux.  Another is 
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population density, which is typically a composite construct of 
both population count and the relative spatial closeness or 
distance between residents in a neighborhood.  The variance in 
ethnic backgrounds among residents in a community and the extent 
to which these residents peacefully coexist with one another, 
ethnic heterogeneity, is a third cause.  Finally, the economic 
health of residents – economic disadvantage, or simply poverty – 
is also regarded as a significant cause.  However, the 
literature wrestles with some challenges given that there has 
not always been agreement on whether these causes result in more 
social capital or less, and at times even fails to confirm any 
relationship with said causes. 
For instance, the importance of residential stability in 
social capital development is supported by evidence indicating 
community ties are stronger and neighborhoods overall healthier 
when there is less residential turnover (Crutchfield, Geerken, 
and Gove 1982; Hagan, MacMillan, and Wheaton 1996; Putnam 2000).  
In particular, upon reviewing crime rates from the 65 largest 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the U.S., 
Crutchfield, Geerkin, and Gove’s (1982) determined high rates of 
residential mobility – the inverse of residential stability – 
and increasing population size place greater strains on social 
integration.  Both factors are argued to be pivotal in weakening 
the ratio of time and space involved in developing and 
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maintaining meaningful social connections within a community.  
In turn, the effectiveness of informal social control measures 
is reduced and crime reduction efforts in high turnover 
neighborhoods are subsequently hampered. 
Institutional continuity, social network strength and 
cohesion are undermined when residential stability is low 
(Coleman 1990; Sampson and Graif 2009).  Sampson and Graif 
(2009) examined this using data from the Project for Human 
Development in Chicago neighborhoods (a large-scale survey of 
nearly 8,800 residents of Chicago, IL).  Their findings revealed 
residential stability has a positive correlation with social 
network ties, net the effect of concentrated disadvantage and 
population diversity.  Yet, observations of the positive effects 
of residential stability on social capital are not always so 
clear.  For example, in the same study, Sampson and Graif (2009) 
observed instances where either residential stability failed to 
predict certain types of social capital (i.e., leadership 
involvement in parochial institutions like schools and religious 
organizations) or where significant relationships with commonly 
associated components like organizational involvement failed to 
appear at all (Sampson and Graif 2009). 
Population density also holds an important place in social 
capital development.  Its importance rests on similarly 
compelling and occasionally conflicting evidence as that which 
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is available for residential stability.  A fair amount of 
research links high population density in metropolitan areas to 
increased exchanges of political knowledge, civic participation 
recruitment, and enhanced non-profit growth (Cho and McLeod 
2007; Graddy and Wang 2009; Saxton and Benson 2005).  In 
particular, a study of nearly 300 U.S. counties by Graddy and 
Wang (2009) noted how increasing philanthropy to community 
foundations could be observed in larger, denser communities. 
Cho and McLeod’s (2007) analysis of data from the SCCB 
revealed higher density areas are more likely to yield social 
capital by way of increased participation in civic life caused 
by greater competition for public resources in such areas (Cho 
and McLeod 2007).  In addition, McCulloch (2003) observed 
population density was the sole predictive element of social 
capital.  Here, social capital among men in households of Great 
Britain was measured with attitudinal statements for 
belongingness, orientation with informal associations, and 
neighborhood activity.  However, as with Cho and McLeod’s study, 
McCulloch’s observance of the relevance of population density 
did not elaborate on whether the effects were consistent for 
both urban and rural neighborhoods. 
Furthermore, there is significant evidence that the 
connection between density and social capital has some important 
qualifying factors.  For instance, population density in 
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homogenous communities tends to be associated more with bonding 
social capital versus bridging social capital.  Thus, 
connections to secondary and tertiary social networks are more 
inhibited (Granovetter 1973; Putnam 2000).  Cho and McLeod 
(2007) also acknowledged supporting evidence that communal 
participation is lower in denser but more ethnically diverse 
communities.  They explained this is due in part to diminished 
psychological ties observed between residents of diverse 
communities that inhibit such participation (Cho and McLeod 
2007).  Denser communities tend to have a higher propensity for 
citizens to observe communal life rather than actively 
participate in it (Cho and McLeod 2007), thus contributing to 
such weaker connections. 
Freeman (2001) found that the connection between density and 
social ties involved yet another important but less cited 
qualifier: the proliferation of automobiles and pedestrian or 
mass transit culture.  In a study of U.S. Census and 
supplemental survey data on urban inequality from Atlanta, GA, 
Boston, MA, and Los Angeles, CA samples, he showed that 
controlling for proliferation of automobile traffic in 
neighborhoods resulted in significantly fewer neighborhood 
social ties (Freeman 2001).  In fact, density was no longer a 
significant predictor of social ties in the study once 
automobile dependency was controlled for. 
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A number of social capital studies further imply ethnic 
heterogeneity and social capital are negatively associated.  
These findings suggest ethnically homogenous groups share 
similar values and behavioral norms, thus making it easier for 
group members to find common ground and subsequently generate 
more trust and tighter social cohesion.  Conversely, the more 
ethnically diverse a community is, the less effective it tends 
to be in generating social capital.  When individuals fail to 
perceive such values or norms within each other, or when groups 
prove dissimilar along such attributes, it becomes much less 
likely that such trust and cohesion will be developed.  Indeed, 
several studies confirm diverse ethnic composition negatively 
correlates with social capital by way of lower social cohesion 
and trust (Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010; Putnam 2007; Sturgis, 
Brunton-Smith, Read, and Allum 2011; Wickes, Zahnow, White, and 
Mazerolle 2015). 
Notably, compared to studies featuring residential stability 
and population density as factors, a good deal more of the 
evidence for social capital’s connections to ethnic 
heterogeneity can be found outside of the U.S (particularly in 
the U.K.).  These are still lacking in attempts to offer clarity 
by considering additional factors like urbanization.  However, 
the aforementioned study by McCulloch (2003) concluded social 
capital is significantly lower in ethnically heterogeneous 
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neighborhoods. 
McCulloch (2003) argued that feelings of belonging and the 
social connections yielded through such feelings are weaker the 
higher ethnic diversity is in an area.  McGhee (2003) and 
Goodhart (2004) respectively found social cohesion and civic 
participation tend to decline when ethnic diversity is high. 
Particularly in McGhee’s (2003) study of the urban Bradford 
district in the U.K., he deduced such negative correlation 
stemmed largely from discord among many White residents.  He 
argued that they felt their needs were often overlooked in favor 
of the residing non-White minorities competing for the same 
limited resources in the community. 
Here again, contrary evidence warrants consideration. In 
particular, limited proof of social withdrawal in ethnically 
diverse neighborhoods (Lolle and Torpe 2011; Savelkoul, 
Gesthuizen, and Scheepers 2010; Wickes, Zahnow, White, and 
Mazerolle 2015) implies ethnic diversity does not inherently 
signify in all communities a lack of social capital by way of 
low cohesion.  Rather, it may be that the type of social capital 
more often generated in homogenous communities is less of the 
bridging variety, and more of the bonding type.  Bonding social 
capital flourishes more naturally when individuals of similar 
ethnic backgrounds meet (McGhee 2003; Putnam 2000). 
This may especially be true of immigrant communities. Here 
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the decision to relocate and where to relocate to is often 
dependent on the amount of community and household social 
capital available for active and potential migrants alike 
(Palmer and Xu 2013).  Zhou (2005) provided clarity to this very 
pattern among Chinese immigrant communities in New York City.  
He summarized that the social networks generated in homogenous 
ethnic communities nested within larger, multiethnic settings 
offered a comfort zone that members of such communities tended 
to prefer due to the various sociocultural factors like 
memories, customs, and language shared (Zhou 2005).  
Unfortunately, as the distinction between bridging and bonding 
types has not often been emphasized in previous efforts to 
examine the effect of ethnic diversity on social capital, the 
current research on this matter is largely speculative. 
Furthermore, the operationalization of social capital seems 
to matter with regard to whether a relationship with ethnic 
heterogeneity is detected.  For instance, rather than defining 
social capital as cohesion or trust, Vermuelen, Tillie and 
Walle’s (2011) study of 96 neighborhoods in Amsterdam used 
number of private foundations (defined as non-governmental, non-
membership, organizations recognized as a legal category with a 
purpose of general public interest) per 1000 residents as the 
main component.  Implied is that with greater concentration of 
these foundations comes greater social capital in the 
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neighborhoods observed. 
Defining social capital in this way, they determined ethnic 
diversity was positively correlated with density of social 
foundations in Amsterdam neighborhoods.  It negatively 
correlated, however, with density of leisure associations 
(Vermeulen, Tillie, and Walle 2011).  In addition, when 
considering contextual factors influencing the negative effect 
of ethnic diversity, Vermeulen et al (2011) noted the polarizing 
influence of fairly recent events like 9/11 and the ensuing 
immigration debates throughout the Netherlands.  These are 
sources of neighborhood fragmentation influencing some of the 
breakdown in social cohesion and networks in more diverse 
neighborhoods. 
Studies exploring poverty as a cause of social capital have 
typically found weak social capital to characterize communities 
of extreme impoverishment.  For the most part, prevailing 
thoughts have been that in poorer communities there are fewer 
social connections and collaborative behavioral norms that could 
serve residents in acquiring resources necessary to negate such 
poverty (e.g., a quality education, lucrative employment 
opportunities, adequate healthcare).  As with the literature on 
the causal effects of ethnic heterogeneity, when compared to 
residential stability and population density, there is somewhat 
more international data to draw upon as evidence for the effects 
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of poverty on social capital. 
Among such findings, Heffernan’s (2002) study of HIV trends 
among the urban poor in the U.K. illustrated how poorer 
neighborhoods routinely struggle to access social capital and 
health services that would allow for HIV treatment and safe sex 
education.  This cycle is further compounded by a widespread 
lack of social resources and poor cohesion attributable to 
inner-city communities where the urban poor tend to reside 
(Heffernan 2002).  Such factors make it even less likely for 
social capital to develop in these areas. 
In explaining why higher income communities are able to 
generate more social capital, Narayan (1997) lays some 
foundation for understanding why the reverse is true of poorer 
communities.  Using government data captured from roughly 6,000 
inhabitants covering 87 villages in Tanzania, Narayan provided a 
rare glimpse into social capital trends within rural communities 
outside of the conventional Western and often U.S.-based 
settings.  Just as important, she discovered a significant 
positive correlation between social capital and household 
expenditures.  An increase in social capital by one standard 
deviation predicted a 20 – 30% increase in spending power per 
household resident in the study (Narayan 1997).  The communities 
comprised of wealthier households tended to exhibit more social 
capital. 
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Narayan (1997) went on to present four main reasons likely 
behind the stark contrast in social capital she found based on 
wealth.  First, from higher levels of social capital, as 
represented by activity in community associations, come more 
effective government services like schools, hospitals and road 
networks (Narayan 1997).  This is important because high quality 
in such public services offer pathways leading away from the 
resource deprivation that so often plagues the poor.  
Communities can be defined as wealthy or poor based upon the 
quality of such services.  Indeed, Narayan (1997) saw that the 
Tanzanian villages with higher associational activity and 
parental participation in local activities ultimately had the 
better public resources (i.e., schools). 
Secondly, she observed social cohesion typically leads to 
the sharing of information that is of mutual economic benefit 
within communities (Narayan 1997).  Thus, the more information 
is shared amongst residents in a community, the wealthier the 
overall community tends to be.  In her study, households in 
villages with  higher social capital were also households that 
tended to share more information – particularly of an 
agricultural nature – more frequently, and thus experienced 
higher crop efficiency and profit as a result (Narayan 1997). 
A third factor Narayan mentioned was the ability of 
households within the villages to cooperate towards addressing 
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problems of community-wide concern.  Villages with higher social 
capital were more likely to have engaged in community road 
building projects and other communal activities designed to 
maintain certain shared assets that impact the overall economic 
health of a community (Narayan 1997).  Finally, she noted it has 
long been recognized that market transactions based on trust-
laden associations lead to stronger economic performance.  
Accordingly, those villages in her study with higher social 
capital had significantly greater likelihood of agricultural 
lending and borrowing practices (Narayan 1997). 
Renowned American sociologists William Julius Wilson (1996) 
and Glenn Loury (1976) indirectly offered some additional 
clarity to these observations.  They noted that poverty is by 
definition the exclusion from social networks and institutions 
that could be leveraged to obtain vital resources like quality 
housing, employment and education.  In short, irrespective of 
geography, it should come as no surprise that there is such 
evidence of lower social capital where poverty is high.  This is 
quite unfortunate, as the literature also shows that communities 
infused with strong caches of social capital are able to address 
poverty and resolve disputes more effectively (Woolcock 2001). 
In contrast, there is some rationale for the notion that 
poverty should be positively associated with social capital. 
Poor households often have few other resources to call upon for 
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economic survival and/or advancement aside from the 
relationships they forge with fellow poor community members or 
those advantageously positioned to help alleviate the effects of 
income deprivation.  In fact, Woolcock (2001) noted being poor 
in an “unpredictable and unforgiving world” often requires 
reliance upon connections with family and friends as primary 
resources to leverage against the scarcities experienced in 
other important assets (e.g., money, advanced education, diverse 
employment opportunities) that earmark such impoverishment. 
In particular, though noted for its absence of external 
social networks, bonding social capital is nonetheless relevant 
as a means of coping with poverty. Close social ties with 
friends and family serve to augment the lack of economic 
resources among the poor, as they can and often do use each 
other as assets (Portes and Landholt 1996; Woolcock 2001).  
Additionally, Cage’s (2014) multi-method research on poverty in 
Kenya revealed a pattern of how organizations in poor 
communities transfer bonding social capital between inhabitants 
of poor communities into bridging social capital.  In this way, 
localized social networks are extended in relevance to connect 
with agents at higher levels of governance. 
With such conflicting evidence in social capital literature 
on the effects of its proclaimed causes, greater clarity in the 
discourse is needed.  This might be achieved by looking to less 
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explored covariates like a community’s urbanization level.  
There is already literature confirming urban and rural 
communities are quite distinctive along the causal factors 
cited. For instance, many geographic definitions of urbanity and 
rurality use population density as a distinguishing quality, 
where the denser a population is the more urban/less rural it is 
(Agency 2005; Pateman 2010/2011; Wilson, Plane, Mackun, 
Fischetti, Goworowska, Cohen, Perry, and Hatchard 2012; Wirth 
1938).  Excluding certain areas of the Southern U.S., it has 
also been found that rural areas typically carry less ethnic 
diversity (Hofferth and Iceland 1998).  Rural areas also tend to 
be poorer than urban (Albrecht, Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000; 
Hofferth and Iceland 1998; Lichter and Eggebeen 1992), and rural 
children are considerably more income- and resource-deprived 
compared with their urban contemporaries (Lichter and Eggebeen 
1992).  Additionally, while residential stability has been of 
concern in both settings, it has typically been rural 
communities that have experienced residential instability via 
loss of their inhabitants to the draw of urban living.  Indeed, 
from the 1940’s through the 70’s, rural populations dropped by 
over 50% (Albrecht, Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000; Beale 1978; 
Larson 1981), and today’s rural communities are widely less 
populated compared to urban areas (Wilson et al. 2012). 
Of particular importance to this proposal, the differences 
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between urban and rural areas are observable with respect to 
social capital and some of its composite parts as well.  Denser 
communities have often been associated with lower social capital 
by way of less interpersonal social interaction, diminished 
civic participation, gaps in such participation, group conflict, 
and incivility (Cho and McLeod 2007; Crawford 2006; Morenoff, 
Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).  Higher density urban communities 
often exhibit reduced community integration and lower support of 
non-profit activities (Graddy and Wang 2009; Lincoln 1977).  
Urban residents have been found to possess lower levels of 
social capital in comparison to rural dwellers when density of 
social connections have been included as part of a 
conceptualization of social capital (Cairns, Til, and Williamson 
2003; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).  Rural residents 
also share strong bonds through tight friendship and kinship 
networks, and are often less tolerant of crime and more 
punitive-minded towards lawbreakers than urban residents 
(Cancino 2005; DeKeseredy et al. 2007). 
Yet, as Jacobs (1961) so staunchly counterargued, social 
capital can and does exist in urban communities.  Crawford’s 
(2006) research in Leeds, one of the largest and most diverse 
cities in England, revealed that both community advocates known 
as neighborhood wardens and local volunteer-based organizations 
were critical in helping residents access important 
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institutional resources. Particularly with the wardens, theirs 
was a function that connected residents in various parts of 
Leeds to local services by harvesting trust from both the 
residents they serve and the institutions controlling access to 
those vital resources (Crawford 2006).  In essence, these 
wardens served as conduits of social capital in a highly 
urbanized setting via the social cohesion and trust they forged 
between community constituents.  Such capital allowed for 
smoother, more equitable flow of vital resources to citizens 
throughout the city. 
Other examples throughout the literature confirm urban 
social capital is a relevant concept in both Eastern and Western 
settings.  In the city of Scranton, PA, Rich (2012) observed how 
the appeal of Scranton neighborhoods to native residents and 
returnees alike, as well as recent efforts to revitalize the 
city, was rooted in social capital.  The social capital was high 
stemming from strong social networks, close familiarity with 
neighbors, and participation in a variety of local institutions 
serving the public (e.g., local political offices).  In Los 
Angeles, CA, homeless residents who were able to draw upon 
social capital by way of their connections to family, friends, 
and especially case workers and support staff in transitional 
housing organizations greatly improved their chances of exiting 
homeless status altogether (Marr 2012). 
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Reynolds (2013) examined data from inner-city Black youth 
throughout four main cities in England and found social capital 
to be both a positive and negative influence in their lives.  On 
one hand, and similar to the observations from Cage’s (2014) 
Kenya research, the reciprocal networks and trust Black youth 
build within their poverty-stricken and marginalized communities 
act as coping mechanisms for dealing with the deprivation and 
racial inequality they routinely confront.  Such capital also 
serves as a resource for such youth in navigating their way out 
of their dire circumstances (Reynolds 2013). 
Yet, Reynolds (2013) also found the type of bonding social 
capital poor Black youth in the study access occasionally 
restricts their expectations of and efforts towards social 
mobility.  The “pulling effect” these impoverished youth seem to 
experience is a phenomenon Liu, Wang and Tao (2013) also noted 
in their research of poor migrant workers in urban China.  The 
effect is described as a compulsion among the urban poor to 
remain in their impoverished settings.  This results from a 
comfort level fostered from bonding with similarly poor 
community inhabitants, and even a sense of obligation towards 
those similarly deprived (Liu, Wang, and Tao 2013).  However, 
given the idiosyncrasies of recent urban development and 
migration in China, the incarnation of bonding social capital 
they observed serves the poor in an another, more unique 
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capacity (Liu, Wang, and Tao 2013). 
Relative to Western countries, China’s rapid urban expansion 
resulting from economic growth and rural-to-urban migration is a 
newer phenomenon.  Moreover, the country’s household 
registration system (known as hukou) largely determines 
urban/rural status, and accordingly the level of access to urban 
housing and support services.  Poorer migrant workers without 
permanent urban residency status are uniquely disadvantaged in 
the housing opportunities made available to them (Liu, Wang, and 
Tao 2013).  Liu et al (2013) found that among those migrant 
workers lacking urban hukou status, social capital in the form 
of networks maintained with local residents with hukou status 
was a vital resource for improving both their chances of finding 
housing in their adopted cities and of obtaining higher quality 
in the housing acquired.  As such, social capital ends up truly 
serving the “getting ahead” function Putnam often discusses in 
works like Bowling Alone (Putnam 2000). 
Similarly, Palmer and Xu (2013) studied just over 3,000 
laborers across seven cities in China (nearly all of whom 
originated from and still held ties to rural communities) and 
determined differential effects of social capital on worker 
health.  Exploring both individual- and community-focused social 
capital, they discovered that individual measures like support 
from friends and presence of either children or older relatives 
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in the household positively correlated with self-ratings of 
health.  Community measures like place attachment, community 
trust and overall community satisfaction also led to higher 
health ratings (Palmer and Xu 2013). 
However, the research revealed that the measures 
neighborhood networks and connections with formal organizations 
were negatively associated with worker health.  Palmer and Xu 
(2013) deduced this was a sign that certain Western notions of 
social capital (which tend to emphasize civic participation and 
formal social networks) may not be as relevant initially or at 
all in influencing positive outcomes like better health given 
China’s more extensive history in using informal, individualized 
networks for social capital.  These findings firmly point to the 
relevance of social capital in both urban and rural places, and 
that it does affect a variety of social phenomena in both types 
of settings. 
Yet, the literature is far from exhaustive; there is still 
far too little known about the complexity of relationships 
involving social capital in different community settings 
(Crawford 2006).  This is no less true of the literature 
pertaining to social capital and crime, and specifically how the 
interaction between the two varies by urban and rural 
classification.  Lin (2001) suggested a key to the difference 
between urban and rural neighborhoods may lie in the demarcation 
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of weak and social ties commensurate with social capital, where 
the social cohesion and homogeneity of strong ties tends to be 
more appropriate for rural neighborhoods versus the weaker ties 
more befitting of urban neighborhoods that are less dependent 
upon such cohesion.  At the very least, Crawford (2006) 
suggested such a possibility as Lin’s hypothesis necessitates 
greater context specificity in social capital research.  
Controlling for factors like urbanization level would be a step 
in this direction. 
Particular to crime, does the urban or rural status of a 
community matter with respect to social capital’s effect on 
crime?  If so, what sorts of variations are observed, and are 
those variations consistent with both national and international 
settings?  To approach an answer, the criminological literature 
incorporating social capital requires closer examination. 
 
Social Capital in Rural and Urban Communities - Social Capital 
and Crime  
Several studies illustrate the connection between social 
capital and crime within the U.S. (Clear, Rose, and Ryder 2001; 
Coleman 1988; De Coster, Heimer, and Wittrock 2006; Messner, 
Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004; Neal 2011; Putnam 2000; Rosenfeld, 
Messner, and Baumer 2001).  The general conclusions struck is 
that social capital minimizes criminal offending, deviant 
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activity, and the culture of violence often associated with 
both.  Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer (2004, 2001) provided 
particularly strong empirical support for social capital’s 
crime-reducing effects through analysis of neighborhoods 
represented in the General Social Survey and the SCCB.  Net the 
influence of common structural covariates (e.g., resource 
deprivation, population size, and Southern geographic 
orientation), they confirmed in two separate studies that social 
capital (measured via social trust and social engagement) 
reduces homicide rates (Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004; 
Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001). 
Recalling that violence and economic disadvantage are common 
indicators of delinquency and adult crime, De Coster, Heimer, 
and Wittrock (2006) also found that family- and community-based 
social capital reduces both the chances of young people behaving 
violently and the effect of disadvantage on violence.  They 
tested their hypotheses on several models of delinquency using 
data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health.  
Here social capital was defined as network closure, parental 
participation in the community, collective supervision, and 
family cohesiveness.  They discovered that nearly all of their 
family-based social capital measures play a significant role 
alongside neighborhood disadvantage in predicting violence among 
young people (De Coster, Heimer, and Wittrock 2006).  Family 
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cohesiveness was shown to provide especially significant 
negative effects on violence in the observed models, and it 
remained significant even after controlling for street-level 
contextual factors conducive to crime (De Coster, Heimer, and 
Wittrock 2006). 
Studies such as these illustrate a tendency in the research 
to corroborate social capital’s connection with crime by drawing 
upon data from nationally representative studies.  In these 
studies, community tends to be quite broad and little, if any, 
consideration is given to how the observed relationships vary by 
urbanization.  Neighborhood crime literature in general, 
however, is much clearer in conveying that crime is higher and 
more troublesome in denser, metropolitan neighborhoods (Akcomak 
and Weel 2011; Barnett and Mencken 2002; Clinard 1964; Wolfgang 
1968; Yamamura 2009).  Despite some compelling evidence to the 
contrary (Bachman 1992; Liu 2005; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 
2006), most studies conclude that densely populated metropolitan 
communities are more prone to criminal offending than 
nonmetropolitan ones (Blau and Blau 1982; Ladbrook 1988; 
Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006; Wirth 1938). 
A possible, albeit seldom tested explanation for this this 
observation draws from components of social capital theory.  
Crime in urban residential communities has been associated with 
high residential mobility (Bursik and Grasmick 1992; Kubrin and 
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Herting 2003; Stults 2010) and economic instability (Weisheit, 
Falcone, and Wells 2006).  Both are variables related to 
weakenings in the social networks and cohesion characteristic of 
strong social capital and demonstrated to reduce criminal and 
deviant behavior (Ladbrook 1988). 
 
Social capital and crime – international discourse.  We know 
little in the U.S about the differences between urban and rural 
areas with respect to relationships between social capital and 
crime.  So too are we limited in our knowledge of such 
relationships in communities internationally.  Both foreign and 
domestic scholarship assessing the connection between social 
capital and criminal activity in residential communities have 
routinely failed to consider smaller and nonmetropolitan areas 
(Cancino 2005).  Yet, when it has, social capital has shown 
itself to be an influential force in reducing crime, and 
producing safer and more productive communities. 
In India, urban neighborhoods with little to no conflict 
have been characterized by sizeable numbers of strong civic 
institutions (e.g., trade unions, professional associations) 
that bridge gaps of discord between communities (Cairns, Til, 
and Williamson 2003; Varshney 2002).  Studies of former 
Aboriginal gang members in inner-city Winnepeg, Manitoba, Canada 
have shown the effectiveness of social capital among the former 
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members. It helps them cope with socialization issues and obtain 
educational and employment opportunities upon exiting gang life 
(Bracken, Deane, and Morrissette 2009). In Northern Ireland, 
Cairns and colleagues (1986) identified positive correlations 
between strong associational networks and lower violence in 
inner city neighborhoods (Cairns, Til, and Williamson 2003; 
Darby 1986). 
Social capital in the form of community organizations that 
operate government-subsidized programs aimed at preventing 
recidivism have yielded positive results in urban China for many 
years (Liu 2005).  In urban neighborhoods throughout Paris, 
France, when riots erupted in 2005 between young Muslim 
immigrants and law enforcement, religious and community leaders 
were pivotal in quelling the violent discord.  Mechanisms of 
bridging social capital (i.e., grassroots, localized efforts to 
negotiate peace terms) employed by these leaders were cited as 
invaluable commodities in the peace process (Judkins 2008). 
Using survey data from Finnish schools stratified by 
residential density and geographic location, Salmi and Kivivuori 
(2006) found that a lack of social capital was associated with 
elevated juvenile delinquency.  Here, they measured social 
capital as parental control, teacher control, parental support, 
teacher support, neighborhood control, trust, and time spent 
with the parents of their closest friends.  They found that all 
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social capital factors tested were negatively correlated to 
juvenile delinquency.  Parental support in these schools (a 
product of informal networks between parents) was particularly 
strong among the factors studied.  When assessed as a full 
model, parental support, teacher control, and interpersonal 
trust remained relevant in the model net the effects of 
structural socioeconomic variables, self-control or scholastic 
achievement (Salmi and Kivivuori 2006). 
Given the strong conceptual alignment between social capital 
and social disorganization, it is worth noting here Sampson and 
Groves’ seminal re-exploration of social disorganization theory 
mentioned in the previous chapter.  They tested their hypotheses 
in the U.K. and confirmed residential communities marked by 
sparse friendship networks, unsupervised teenage peer groups, 
and low organizational participation have disproportionately 
higher rates of crime and delinquency (Sampson and Groves 1989).  
In fact, each of these traits mediated many of the relationships 
between such rates and other common correlates of crime (e.g., 
low SES, residential mobility). 
Sampson and Groves also revealed that urbanization (in 
conjunction with ethnic heterogeneity) negatively affects 
friendship networks and is positively correlated with the 
inability of a community to control its youth.  Additional 
findings supported a large direct effect of residential 
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stability on local friendship networks (net the influence of 
urbanization, socioeconomic status, and ethnic heterogeneity).  
Positive correlations between family disruption and disorderly 
peer-group behavior by teenagers were also found.  Finally, they 
found a large independent effect of unsupervised teenage peer 
groups on burglary, motor vehicle theft, and vandalism (Sampson 
and Groves 1989). 
Making the case for expanding international studies of 
social capital effects on crime.  For at least two reasons, 
Sampson and Groves’ seminal social disorganization work serves 
as a viable indirect attempt to examine the influence of urban 
and rural variations on social capital’s effect on crime in a 
setting outside the U.S.  First, variables like organizational 
participation and friendship networks in Sampson and Groves’ 
early social disorganization model also define social capital.  
Second, this model specifically incorporated urbanization. 
However, as theirs was not a direct study of social capital, 
Sampson and Groves’ social disorganization research is not 
nearly enough to address the uncertainty in international crime 
literature about the effects of social capital across levels of 
urbanization.  Additionally, even if theirs was a more direct 
exploration of social capital, few concerted efforts to account 
for urbanization in studies of social capital have been made in 
the 25 years since Sampson and Groves (1989) research.  In sum, 
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for communities in both domestic and international settings, 
there are virtually no ecological studies of social capital in 
crime literature where the full spectrum of urbanization is a 
focal point. 
This void in the current research further fuels the growing 
sentiment in recent years that expanding international focus on 
social capital in crime literature is warranted.  As Halpern 
(2005) articulated, 
At present, we do not have easily to hand the same 
comprehensive collation of data [referring to the data 
Putnam and colleagues used to defend the position of 
declining social capital in the U.S.] on social capital 
trends in other nations, but the data we do have strongly 
suggest that the US story should not be taken as 
universally representative. (Halpern 2005:211) 
 
Findings from those international studies that are available 
reveal complex correlations between social capital and crime, as 
well as contradictions similar to those found in the U.S. data 
highlighting the criminogenic aspects of social capital. 
Gang research in China has revealed certain gang 
affiliations in large, densely populated cities offer 
considerable benefits to ex-offenders.  The effect transpires 
via a strain of social capital that compensates for the 
advantages lost when positive social capital (i.e., strong 
interpersonal connections to legitimate institutions like 
education, employment and marriage) is unavailable (Liu 1999).  
Triad gang leaders within the country have also benefited at 
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times from the successful transference of social capital into 
economic gains via illegitimate stock market manipulation (Lo 
2010). 
In the favelas (slums) of Rio De Janiero, Brazil, the 
proliferation of violence committed by drug traffickers has long 
been linked to a perverse version of social capital.  Here, 
social capital is in the form of collusion between major 
trafficking cartels, law enforcement and political officials 
(Arias 2002).  Throughout these studies, and similar to what the 
U.S. literature has revealed, emphasis has either been 
exclusively on urban communities or no distinction has been 
offered between urban and rural settings.  It is a glaring 
omission given that nonmetropolitan communities have 
traditionally been regarded as havens of peace, sociability, and 
neighborly cohesion (Hofferth and Iceland 1998; Smith and Huff 
1982; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006).  In addition, the 
relatively scant empirical evidence that is available supports 
the premise that neighborhood models of social capital and crime 
vary by urbanization level. 
Lee and Bartowski (2004) found that faith-based associations 
and civic engagement were negatively correlated with juvenile 
homicide among young people in US rural neighborhoods.  But the 
findings do not hold in urban areas (Lee and Bartowski 2004).  
They surmised that urban crime was influenced by a greater range 
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of covariates (e.g., socioeconomic disadvantage, drug activity) 
given that the model with those covariates was stronger than the 
social capital model tested (Lee and Bartowski 2004).  They also 
observed that civic engagement bound by firm moral codes seemed 
to matter more for rural areas than urban ones due specifically 
to the higher proportion of rural residents affiliated with 
“civically engaged” religious denominations.   
Faith-based associations and civic engagement were found to 
be negatively correlated with murders among young people in 
rural neighborhoods, but disconnected from such crime in urban 
communities (Lee and Bartowski 2004).  This is likely because of 
the relative absence of covariates in rural areas believed to 
influence urban crime rates.  This is verified through 
significantly higher estimations of model fit in urban areas for 
models with those covariates than for social capital-based 
models.  But by and large, these studies are not common and a 
heavy skew towards urban settings characterizes crime literature 
where social capital is the main independent variable. 
The lack of attention on urbanization in ecological crime 
discourse is not entirely surprising in light of evidence 
implying urbanization may not matter.  Traditional notions of 
great disparity between urban and rural crime have begun to 
erode in recent years in light of data supporting the notion 
there is less distinction in crime rates between communities 
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along the urbanization spectrum (Weisheit and Donnermeyer 2000).  
Noted among possible factors influencing this diminishing 
disparity is the continuing decline in differences between 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan communities due to 
standardization of and broader access to vital commodities like 
education, transportation, and employment (Fischer 1995; Luloff 
and Krannich 2002; Petee and Kowalski 1993; Reisig and Cancino 
2004; Ritzer 2004, 2008).   
Where ecological crime theories like social disorganization 
and collective efficacy are the concern, there is growing 
sentiment that urbanization holds little to no bearing on how 
most of these theories function (Cancino 2005; Osgood and 
Chambers 2000).  Thus it can be presumed such theories are just 
as applicable to less urbanized settings (Laub 1983; Reisig and 
Cancino 2004).  Further evidence highlights that social capital 
also functions similarly between urban and rural neighborhood 
types, generally flowing in a systemic fashion from private 
networks to parochial ones (Reisig and Cancino 2004).  
Therefore, in considering crime and crime theories specific to 
residential communities, where social capital is a focus, it 
could be argued that level of urbanization in a given community 
is not an important factor. 
Be that as it may, contrary evidence still supports the 
notion that urbanization does matter and should be considered 
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more often in theories on community crime precisely because 
these theories are just as relevant in less urban settings.  For 
instance, the main tenets of collective efficacy – mutual trust 
among neighbors and the willingness to act on behalf of the 
common good – are found to be characteristic of rural 
neighborhoods (Jobes 1999; Osgood and Chambers 2000; Petee and 
Kowalski 1993; Sampson and Bartusch 1998).  Kinship and 
friendship networks associated with collective efficacy are also 
strong in these types of neighborhoods and rural residents have 
been found to be less tolerant of crime and more agreeable to 
harsh punishment for lawbreakers in comparison to city residents 
(Ball 2001; Bouley and Wells 2001; Cancino 2005; Donnermeyer, 
Jobes, and Barclay 2006; Weisheit, Falcone, and Wells 2006; 
Wilson 1991).  Urbanization also matters in that rural 
communities have smaller populations and lower population 
densities (DeKeseredy et al. 2007).  As noted previously, social 
capital tends to be higher and crime lower where population 
densities are lower (Akcomak and Weel 2011; Bourdieu 1985; 
McCulloch 2003; Putnam 2000). 
Rural residents are also more likely to contribute to 
bonding social capital by way of preferential offerings of 
social support to family members and close friends (Amato 1993; 
Reisig and Cancino 2004) over individuals outside of such 
networks.  Occasionally, this results in greater difficulty for 
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non-residents when victimized within rural communities in 
gaining assistance from local residents.  The same structural 
constraints (i.e., poverty, poor education, 
homelessness/joblessness) found in urban locales contributing to 
crime can also be found in nonmetropolitan places and are 
similarly associated with higher rates of juvenile violence when 
gone unchecked (Cancino 2005; Osgood and Chambers 2000).  Some 
research even contradicts prevailing theoretical assumptions in 
finding the presence of social disorganization within more rural 
communities, resulting in higher youth arrest rates for violent 
acts, homicide, and fear of crime (Barnett and Mencken 2002; 
DeKeseredy et al. 2007; Krannich, Berry, and Greider 1989; Lee, 
Maume, and Ousey 2003; Osgood and Chambers 2000; Petee and 
Kowalski 1993; Spano and Nagy 2005). 
Hypothesis.  Clearly, there is significant disagreement over 
how crime operates outside of urban communities, and 
specifically how versions of crime models influenced by social 
capital operate within these settings.  One way to alleviate 
such confusion, and in doing so spark advancement in 
criminological theory, is by assessing how well the theory works 
across multiple settings (Reisig and Cancino 2004).  In that 
respect, as well as to dispel some of the general confusion 
about how relational theories of crime like those incorporating 
social capital vary by country and urbanization status of 
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communities within each country, this dissertation proposes to 
explore urbanization as a key variable differentiating 
variations in residential community crime models influenced by 
social capital in the U.K.  Despite compelling examples like 
Bursik and Grasmick's systemic work suggesting social networks 
and the process of developing those networks can mediate the 
effects of structural constraints related to crime (Bursik and 
Grasmick 1992; Bursik and Grasmick 1995), structural factors 
have tended to be favored over relational theories like social 
capital in explaining neighborhood-level crime (Albrecht, 
Albrecht, and Albrecht 2000; Barnett and Mencken 2002; Laub 
1983; Smith and Huff 1982). 
This dissertation will specifically seek to address the 
following questions: 
1. Is social capital the same concept between urban and rural 
communities in the U.K.?  Specifically, do traditional 
indicators of social capital (friendship bonds, trust, and 
organizational participation) vary significantly in their 
levels across rural and urban communities in the U.K.? 
2. Do structural factors (e.g., poverty, residential stability) 
similarly influence crime across both rural and urban areas in 
the U.K.? 
3. To what extent does social capital mediate the effects of 
structural characteristics on crime?   
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From these questions, the hypotheses to be tested are: 
- Hypothesis 1 – Social capital is not the same between urban 
and rural communities given that the components vary.  In 
particular, it is predicted trust and organizational 
participation effects are similar across urban and rural 
areas.  Exclusive friendship bonds, however, are predicted to 
be significant in rural communities (bonding social capital) 
and inclusive bonds are predicted to be more significant in 
urban areas (bridging social capital). 
- Hypothesis 2 – Concentrated disadvantage, residential 
stability, and ethnic diversity affect crime in similar ways 
across urban and rural communities. 
- Hypothesis 3 – Net the effects of poverty, residential 
stability, and ethnic diversity, social capital negatively 
affects crime in U.K. communities.  However, the effects are 
not uniform across levels of urbanization.   
In the next chapter, the nature of the data and analytical 
steps needed to complete this dissertation research are 
specified.  The operationalization and analytical challenges for 
the research are also reviewed. 
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CHAPTER IV  
 
METHODS 
 
This chapter discusses the data sources, units of analyses, 
variables, and analytical techniques used in this dissertation.   
 
SOURCES 
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the British 
Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) provided the data for this 
dissertation.  Both ONS and BSAS data were differentiated by 
local authority code, a geographic distinction common throughout 
the U.K. for distinguishing communities.  Both datasets were 
also available for the last 30 consecutive years. 
In particular, as the largest independent producer of 
official statistical data for the U.K. (Statistics 2016), the 
ONS is a major clearinghouse for a wide assortment of data 
captured at both individual and aggregate levels, and is also 
responsible for the decennial census of England and Wales.  The 
BSAS is a quantitative study of long-term trends and 
perspectives among English and Welsh residents managed through 
the National Centre for Social Research since 1983.  Employing a 
multi-methods data collection approach (i.e., interpersonal 
interviews and self-completed questionnaires), it annually 
captures citizens’ attitudes on such issues as national defense, 
the economy, and the state of welfare in the region.  Additional 
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questions address personal beliefs and behaviors along social, 
economic, political and moral domains, including a number of 
items capturing components of social capital.Variables from the 
2001 BSAS were used in this dissertation to capture social 
capital; these variables were not available in later iterations 
of the survey.  Specifically, there were three times as many 
measures of trust in the 2001/2002 BSAS in comparison to the 
more recent 2008/2009 iteration of the survey available at the 
time of this study.  There were also twice as many measures of 
friendship connections when compared to the more recent data 
available. 
Measures of social capital captured in the BSAS were merged 
with aggregate level crime data and covariates from the ONS 
using local authority code as the common geographic identifier.  
Thus, it was important to ensure ample local authority coverage 
in the BSAS sample selected.  Fortunately, the 2001 BSAS sample 
encompassed 2,839a respondents distributed across 41% (n=142) of 
the 345 local authority areas in England and Wales.  
As BSAS respondents were selected through multi-stage 
stratified random sampling (Research 2000a), so to then were the 
local authority areas in which the respondents resided.  
Additional shapefiles for the local authority areas deemed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!a!Note: The original BSAS sample was 3,287 respondents.  However, after accounting for 
missing data and eliminating Scottish respondents (the Scotland BSAS questionnaire 
differed considerably from the version provided to England and Wales), the final valid 
sample was 2,839. !
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necessary for calculating spatial autocorrelation (see Section 
IV - Data Analysis) were acquired via open source Internet 
content managed through the University of Edinburgh.  Upon 
aggregating the BSAS and ONS data, and performing additional 
filtering for missing geographic location data, the final sample 
employed for this dissertation was 131 local authority areas 
(101 urban areas, with an average of 20 BSAS respondents per 
area; 30 rural areas, with an average of 18 respondents per 
area). 
 
UNITS OF ANALYSES 
The units of analyses in this dissertation was U.K. counties 
– a term coined for this study as a means of allowing for more 
direct, measurement units comparison with similar U.S.- based 
studies. It was derived from the aforementioned local authority 
code designations used throughout the U.K.  These codes are a 
popular geographic classification and data reporting standard 
for official statistical data in the U.K. (Gibson 2008; Pateman 
2010/2011).  The counties/codes consist of nine digits 
identifying the country and place code of each area they are 
assigned to. Such coded areas are roughly the equivalent of 
counties in the U.S., as “wards” within local authority areas 
are the equivalent of census tracts.  Thus, as U.S counties are 
composed of numerous census tracts, so too U.K. counties are 
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composed of numerous wards (Pateman 2011). 
Admittedly, in studying neighborhood-based theories like 
social capital, a spatial definition of neighborhoods that 
approximates counties in the U.K. is challenging.  For one 
thing, it is solely a material definition in spite of evidence 
that residents can and often do define their neighborhoods both 
in material and non-material terms (Bell 2007; Bell, Lloyd, and 
Vatovec 2010).  A purely spatial, materialistic definition like 
U.K. county code thus overlooks the ideational or cultural 
aspect of a neighborhood’s profile, the importance of which Bell 
(2007) noted in distinguishing “second rurality” from “first 
rurality”.  Furthermore, neighborhood literature in the social 
sciences often fluctuates between material and non-material 
definitions (Bell 2007; Bell, Lloyd, and Vatovec 2010). 
Nonetheless, for a number of reasons, it made sense to apply 
a spatial definition via the U.K. county codes designation.  
First, a spatial definition like U.K. county code is consistent 
with the tendency in social science studies of aggregate units 
towards materialist notions of neighborhood (Bell, Lloyd, and 
Vatovec 2010).  Second, these codes are also a standard that has 
traditionally offered distinctions by urbanization, which was 
vital attempting to distinguish varying effects of social 
capital on crime between urban and rural communities 
respectively.  Third, county-level aggregation is consist with 
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prevailing literature that tests social capital and related 
theories using similar units of analysis (Beyerlein and Hipp 
2005; Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004; Ousey and Lee 2010; 
Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001), along with several works 
showing precedent that neighborhoods and communities can be 
approximated via broader macro-level interpretation (Lee and 
Ousey 2001; Lee, Thomas, and Ousey 2010; Markowitz, Bellair, 
Liska, and Liu 2001; Sampson and Groves 1989).  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
The dependent variables, mean rates of violent and non-
violent crime per thousand residents, were captured from police 
recorded crime incidents between 2001 and 2002 supplied by the 
Office of National Statistics (ONS).  Forty-three police 
agencies, along with the British Transport Police, record all 
reported crime in England and Wales.  Though limited only to 
crime reported to police officials, and thus poor in estimating 
typically underreported crimes like sexual assault, this data 
was available for both violent and non-violent crimes, and was 
differentiated by U.K. county code (Statistics 2012). 
Prior to final preparation and publication via the ONS, the 
data was checked for quality on a three month cycle by the Home 
Office Statistics Unit.  Additional quality assurance came from 
calibration between the notifiable offenses reported and data 
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recording standards governed through the Home Office Counting 
Rules and the National Crime Recording Standard.  The data were 
made available to the public through the Research Development & 
Statistics (RDS) Division of the U.K's Home Office – a major 
clearinghouse for national crime data in the U.K. – and the RDS 
Division's Crime Reduction and Community Safety Group provided 
such data across multiple years dating back to 1981.   
Confirmatory factor analysis and reliability testing were 
used to determine how well ONS crime indicators measured uniform 
constructs of violent and non-violent crime.  Specifically, four 
indicators were tested for violent crime (violence against the 
person, wounding or other act endangering life, other wounding, 
and common assault) and eight indicators for non-violent crime 
(harassment including penalty notices for disorder, robbery, 
theft from the person, criminal damage including arson, burglary 
in a dwelling, burglary other than a dwelling, theft of a motor 
vehicle, and theft from a motor vehicle).  As per Table 1 below, 
both violent and non-violent crime variables showed high 
intercorrelation and confirmed the presence of uniform 
constructs for both types of crime: 
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Table 1: Reliability Analysis for Violent and Non-Violent Crime 
Measures  
  
Violent Crime 
Reliability for 4 Items  Alpha 
.825 
 
 Standardized Item Alpha 
.859 
 
Non-Violent Crime     
Reliability for 8 Items  Alpha 
.912 
 
 Standardized Item Alpha 
.938 
 
 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 The main independent variable in this analysis was social 
capital.  To measure social capital, there were three key 
components made available through the 2001 BSAS: trust, 
friendship bonds, and organizational participation. 
As per the extant literature, trust is a key component of 
social capital.  For this study, trust was initially represented 
via mean scores for three composite trust measures.  These were 
derived from a series of ordinal inquiries addressing trust in 
the government (England and Wales, respectively), and across a 
broad spectrum of institutions with respect to whether financial 
resources under government purview were being spent in the best 
interests of the people (see Appendix A for specific BSAS 
variables used).  Factor and reliability analyses (see Table 2) 
confirmed a scale fit of all trust measures into one of three 
categories – trust in the U.K. government, trust in public 
institutions, and trust in private institutions – explaining 64% 
total variation: 
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Table 2: Reliability Analysis for Trust Measures (BSAS)  
 
Reliability Coefficients 
for Trust Measures 
 
 Alpha 
.849 
 
 Standardized Item Alpha 
.848 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, mean scores for the three sets of trust variables 
were calculated for each BSAS respondent.  Then, the cumulative 
average for all such respondents within each U.K. county was 
calculated to represent estimates of each dimension of trust in 
each county. 
Concerning friendship bonds, even the most rudimentary 
social capital measure accounts for the volume and density of 
friendship networks residents maintain within their communities.  
Thus, these bonds were important to include in this study and 
were measured through self-reported volume of friends in two 
distinct spheres.  Particularly, in order to measure bonding 
friendship networks, the following question from the BSAS was 
used: “Think now of people who live near you – in your 
neighbourhood or district.  How many of these people are close 
friends of yours?”  In order to measure bridging friendship 
networks, the following BSAS question was used: “How many other 
close friends do you have – apart from those at work, in your 
neighbourhood, or family members? Think, for instance, of 
friends at clubs, church, or the like.”  The number of friends 
reported in response to both questions was aggregated, with the 
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cumulative average taken to represent extent of bridging and 
bonding friendships networks in each U.K. county. 
Membership and involvement in social organizations is a 
third well-recognized component of social capital.  As scholars 
like Putnam argued, organizational activity typically results 
from a sense of belongingness and obligation to the community 
with which one affiliates (Putnam 1995; Putnam 2000; White 
2006).  However, organizational membership alone does not 
capture social capital; one could very well be a member of 
several organizations, but attend few meetings and/or avoid 
service to these institutions.  Fortunately, BSAS variables 
under this construct reflected both the type and mean frequency 
of respondents' involvement across a variety of organizations 
within the last 12 months prior to survey respondents’ 
participation (see Appendix B for specific BSAS variables used). 
As illustrated in Table 3, and similar to the crime and 
trust measures, there was confirmation of construct uniformity 
and a significant scale fit between all seven organizational 
participation items: 
 
Table 3: Reliability Analysis for Organizational Participation 
Measures (BSAS) 
 
Reliability for 
Organizational 
Participation Measures 
 Alpha 
.576 
 
 Standardized Item Alpha 
.598 
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Accordingly, one composite variable explaining 44% of data 
variation was distinguished from these items.  Aggregate mean 
scores for each participation variable were calculated for each 
BSAS respondent.  Then, the average respondent scores within 
each U.K. county was calculated to represent the community 
average for organizational participation in each county. 
 
ADDITIONAL COVARIATES 
In addition to the dependent and independent variables, a 
number of structural covariates and controls were incorporated 
into this study to determine the effect of social capital on 
correlations between such variables and U.K. crime rates.  
Specifically, concentrated disadvantage, residential stability, 
and ethnic diversity are all variables related to urbanization 
status, crime and social capital in residential communities.  
Therefore, by accounting for these variables in the crime models 
estimated, it could be determined if social capital mediated, 
moderated, or held no influence on crime rates when such 
covariates were accounted for.  These variables were provided 
through the 2001 U.K. Census, and made available through the 
ONS. 
Concentrated disadvantage for England and Wales was measured 
via deprivation indices calculated by Oxford University on 
behalf of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Welsh 
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Office and Welsh Local Government Association respectively.  
Both were derived from the 2001 U.K. Census, which is the last 
cycle for which complete data is currently accessible.  These 
indices offered a more robust conceptualization of disadvantage 
than income poverty alone by accounting for additional resource 
and opportunity deficiencies in employment/employable skills, 
health, education, job training, housing, access to social 
services, living environment and crime prevention measures 
reported in each U.K. county area. 
Residential stability was captured via two measures – rate 
of population turnover per thousand residents and percent of 
homeowners – recorded in the 2001 U.K. Census for England and 
Wales.  Ethnic diversity was derived from the percentage of 
respondents in each U.K. county recorded as being non-White 
and/or non-British.  As with information for residential 
stability, ethnic diversity data is captured through the 2001 
U.K. Census. 
As a control for the two different countries represented in 
the data, country identification was represented through the 
dichotomous coding of England and Wales, where England was coded 
“1” and Wales as “0”.  While there was no specific theoretical 
literature specifying that relationships between crime and 
social capital should vary between the two countries, England 
and Wales did vary considerably by the crime and structural 
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measures in this study.  Thus, the distinction of the two 
countries was included in the hypothesized models to determine 
if any model variation could be attributed to this factor, and 
if the affect of country identification varied once social 
capital was included. 
In order to measure urbanization level, the ONS provided an 
ordinal scale differentiating urban/rural community status and 
population density (Agency 2005; Pateman 2010/2011). This scale 
built upon the ONS’ Urban 50/Rural 50 scale, but added a clearer 
definition of population density in each category (Bibby and 
Shepard 2004; Pateman 2010/2011): 
 6 = Urban – Less Sparse 
 5 = Urban – Sparse 
 4 = Town & Fringe – Less Sparse 
 3 = Town & Fringes – Sparse 
 2 = Village, Hamlet & Isolated Dwellings – Less Sparse 
 1 = Village, Hamlet, Isolated Dwellings – Sparse 
For this study, as per notes from Bibby and Shepard (2004), the 
scale above was dichotomized; categories 1 through 4 were 
treated as rural and coded as “2”, while 5 and 6 were labeled 
“urban” and coded as “1”.  Thus, all U.K. counties in this study 
were classified into one of the two categories. 
Additionally, given the relevance of both spatial and non-
spatial attributes in defining neighborhoods, this sparsity-
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derived dichotomy was compared with BSAS respondents’ self-
descriptions of the places they live.  BSAS respondents further 
had the option of describing their neighborhoods as urban (i.e., 
“big cities”, “small cities/towns”) or rural (i.e. “country 
villages”, “farm/country homes”); suburbs were excluded from the 
analysis. 
When compared to the self-identified BSAS data for 
neighborhood type, the ONS-derived definition is slightly more 
conservative for urban and considerably more so for rural.  
Respondents in the BSAS data indicated 124 urban areas and 66 
rural.  However, the BSAS definitions also contained some 
overlap wherein certain respondents within the same U.K. county 
fluctuated between defining the county as urban and rural.  
Thus, for the purpose of maintaining mutual exclusivity, this 
study applied the spatial dichotomized definition of urban and 
rural derived from ONS data. 
Finally, in addition to these measures, a test for spatial 
autocorrelation was performed to determine if contiguous 
counties exhibited greater similarity for any of the crime 
variables, and thus would require additional data weighting in 
any models tested.  By and large, studies of spatial areas 
reveal such areas in close proximity tend to exhibit greater 
similarities than those further in distance (Rookey 2012; Tobler 
1970).  Particularly, in studies of both crime and social 
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capital, there is some precedence for spatial autocorrelation 
occurring when these concepts are studied at aggregate levels 
given that neighboring communities tend to exhibit similar 
structural and behavioral trends (Scribner, Theall, Ghosh-
Dastidar, Mason, Cohen, and Simonsen 2007; Socia and Stamatel 
2012; Takagi, Ikeda, and Kawachi 2012). Accordingly, it stood to 
reason that such correlation needed to be investigated, and 
managed if present, in order to avoid data inaccuracies and 
overall weaker analytical strength (Rookey 2012) in this study. 
Moran’s I – a common method used for illustrating spatial 
autocorrelation (Anselin 2005; Gunaratna, Liu, and Park) – 
revealed the following: 
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Table 4: Moran’s I Estimates of ONS Crime Rates for U.K. 
Counties (N = 131) 
 
 
Violent Offenses Moran’s I (sig) 
Violence against person .234 (.01) 
Wounding/ 
other life-endangering act 
.188(.04) 
Other wounding .165 (.02) 
Common assault .233 (.03) 
  
Non-violent Offenses  
Harassment .207 (.02) 
Robbery .330 (.01) 
Theft from the person .200 (.01) 
Criminal damage (e.g., arson) .187 (.01) 
Burglary (in dwelling) .301 (.01) 
Burglary (other) .260 (.01) 
Theft of motor vehicle .394 (.01) 
Theft from motor vehicle .300 (.01) 
 
 
As per Table 4, there were varying degrees of autocorrelation 
with certain counties for violent and non-violent crime rate 
estimates.  Thus, additional weighting variables were 
incorporated into the path and regression models developed for 
this research. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis in this dissertation entailed a combination of 
structural equation modeling (SEM) to test Hypotheses #1 and #3, 
and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test Hypothesis 
#2.  Support for combining SEM and OLS multivariate regression 
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in this way can be found in similar macro-level research by 
Smith and Damphousse (1998).  Given that SEM represents an 
effort to impose models upon existing data, OLS regression 
analyses also served as means to determining the models that the 
data did support in instances where the imposed SEM models fell 
short.  
 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
Model estimates generated via structural equation modeling 
(SEM) featured prominently throughout this study.  SEM allows 
for testing of the equivalence of measurement components and 
structural models alike for different samples of a population 
(Byrne 2010).  It has become especially popular in the last 20 
years given its ability to detect direct, indirect, and total 
effects of variables on one another by allowing dependent 
variables in one equation to serve as explanatory independent 
variables in another (Liu, Wang, and Tao 2013; Smith and 
Damphousse 1998).  A few studies even offer precedence that SEM 
can be a valuable technique in modeling crime estimates with 
aggregate U.K. data when respondents per sample unit are small 
(Kaylen and Pridemore 2013; Markowitz, Bellair, Liska, and Liu 
2001), such as is the case in this dissertation. 
Hypothesis 1 was tested by running two six-factor recursive 
measurement models – one for urban U.K. counties and one for 
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rural – where a single latent measure of social capital was 
estimated.  The models consisted of three composite variables 
for trust, two for friendship bonds (one for bonding, one for 
bridging), and one for organizational participation as 
illustrated in Figure 2:   
 
 
Figure 2: Model for Social Capital (Estimated Simultaneously for 
Urban and Rural U.K. Counties) 
  
  
Results from these path models determined the composition of the 
social capital composite measures to be used in later stages of 
SEM analysis.    
In order to address Hypothesis 2, multivariate linear 
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regression coefficients were estimated between concentrated 
disadvantage, residential stability, ethnic diversity, country 
identification and observed composite measures of crime rate 
while controlling for spatial autocorrelation for both urban and 
rural U.K. counties.  In order to address the third hypothesis, 
full structural models for violent and non-violent crime rate 
were estimated using composite measures of social capital 
distinguished by urbanization, and incorporating the structural 
covariates (see Figures 3 & 4): 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Full Structural Model for Social Capital and Violent 
Crime Rate (Estimated Simultaneously for Urban and Rural U.K. 
Counties) 
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Figure 4: Full Structural Model for Social Capital and Non-
Violent Crime Rate (Estimated Simultaneously for Urban and Rural 
U.K. Counties) 
 
 
 
This dissertation proposed that each SEM model estimated would 
reject the null hypothesis of group equivalence.  Thus, the 
argument of group variance between model estimates for urban and 
rural U.K. county samples would be supported. 
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CHAPTER V  
FINDINGS 
This dissertation builds upon the work of Pierre Bourdieu, 
James Coleman and Robert Putnam by both confirming that social 
capital is multidimensional, and that it is both influenced and 
influenced by a variety of social constructs.  With respect to 
crime, numerous scholars have demonstrated the relevance of 
social capital as a factor in developing predictive community 
crime models.  However, as findings from this study illustrated, 
social capital does not affect all crimes the same in all 
communities.  In fact, at minimum this study offers support that 
the influence of social capital is largely a matter of which 
crimes are being considered, and whether or not the community is 
urban or rural. 
In this chapter, results and implications from tests of all 
three hypotheses are discussed.  Path models and goodness of fit 
indices are presented and explored, along with relevant OLS 
regression tables.  For all variables exceeding normality 
parameters, the base-10 logarithm used.  
 
DESCRIPTIVES OF URBAN AND RURAL COMMUNITIES 
Consistent with the community-based literature on criminal 
offending and structural demographics, U.K. crime rates in this 
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study (see Table 5) were generally higher in urban communities, 
as was deprivation level and ethnic diversity:   
 
Table 5: Variable Summary (All, Urban and Rural) 
 
 All  
(N = 131) 
Urban  
(N= 101) 
Rural  
(N = 30) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conversely, homeownership and residential turnover tended to be 
higher in rural settings. Concerning homeownership, this 
observation is consistent with past U.K. Census data reporting 
higher numbers of residents with owner-occupied status in rural 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES –  
Violent Crimes 
Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD 
 
 
Violence against Person 11.81 6.97 13.21 7.24 7.08 2.71 
Wounding/Other Act     
Endangering Life 0.30 0.30 0.36 0.31 0.12 0.10 
Other Wounding 3.89 2.43 4.43 2.49 2.08 0.81 
Common Assault 4.13 3.42 4.55 3.70 2.69 1.54 
Overall Violent Crime 20.14 12.05 22.56 12.53 11.97 4.51 
       
Non-Violent Crimes       
Harassment 2.08 1.40 2.29 1.48 1.40 0.82 
Robbery 1.97 2.79 2.46 3.01 0.33 0.34 
Theft from Person 2.18 5.09 2.69 5.71 0.49 0.38 
Criminal Damage             
(incl Arson) 19.75 7.61 21.86 7.27 12.66 3.20 
Burglary in Dwelling 7.61 5.00 8.83 5.03 3.50 1.43 
Burglary Other than      
Dwelling 8.24 4.15 8.87 4.31 6.12 2.66 
Theft of a Motor Vehicle 5.87 3.94 6.86 3.91 2.53 1.37 
Theft from a Motor 
Vehicle 12.38 6.88 13.92 6.85 7.23 3.82 
Overall Non-Violent 
Crime 60.09 29.65 67.76 29.07 34.26 11.53 
       
COVARIATES       
Deprivation Level 23775 8502 25295 8191 18655 7585 
Ethnic Diversity 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.03 
Homeownership 0.70 0.10 0.69 0.11 0.76 0.03 
Pop. Turnover Rate 6.10 5.03 5.62 4.97 7.71 4.96 
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communities (Joshi, Dodgeon, and Hughes 2005; Joshi, Hughes, and 
Dodgeon 2006). 
As for residential turnover, while higher turnover in rural 
areas might initially be surprising in light of historical 
trends showing urban residents are comparatively more transient 
(Dennett and Stillwell 2008), the contradictory evidence is not 
without some precedent.  In fact, for the 2001 census year 
represented in this dissertation, demographic profiles of 
England and Wales revealed rural communities had higher 
population turnover that urban communities (Joshi, Dodgeon, and 
Hughes 2005; Joshi, Hughes, and Dodgeon 2006).  This was 
especially noticeable after controlling for international 
immigration, which makes up a larger amount of the turnover 
occurring in urban areas (Joshi, Dodgeon, and Hughes 2005). 
The life course transition of young U.K. residents – 
especially aged 20-29 – offers some explanation.  For much of 
the internal migration that contributes to higher turnover in 
rural communities, the 20-something cohort tends to be more apt 
to leave their own families to start families of their own 
(Joshi, Dodgeon, and Hughes 2005).  Amongst these young people, 
the more frequent pattern seems to be rural young people leaving 
to settle in urban areas. 
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TESTING HYPOTHESIS #1 
With respect to components of social capital, urban and 
rural communities were remarkably similar.  Table 6 illustrates 
that mean estimates of trust, friendship, and organizational 
participation were nearly identical for both urban and rural 
U.K. counties: 
 
 
Table 6: Variable Summary – Social Capital (All, Urban and 
Rural) 
 
  
 All (N = 131)  Urban (N= 101) Rural (N = 30) 
 
       
SOCIAL CAPITAL  Mean   SD  Mean   SD  Mean   SD 
Social Trust – 
Public 2.6 0.2 2.6 0.2 2.5 0.2 
Social Trust – 
Private 2.8 0.2 2.7 0.2 2.8 0.2 
Bonding Friendships 1.4 0.7 1.4 0.7 1.4 0.6 
Bridging Friendships 2.3 1.4 2.3 1.4 2.2 1.3 
Organizational 
Participation  1.6 0.4 1.6 0.4 1.7 0.4 
 
  
However, SEM estimates revealed important nuances between urban 
and rural settings concerning how these components contribute to 
a composite model of social capital.  For instance, while the 
proposed model produced path coefficients for the urban sample, 
it initially failed to run for rural U.K. counties. Exploratory 
factor analysis revealed that the variable associated with 
“trust in government” was accountable for this initial failure 
of the rural model.    
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Results for Hypothesis #1 
Once omitted, coefficients for the rural model were 
successfully produced as well: 
 
 
Figure 5: Estimates for Hypothesized Path Model of Social 
Capital (Urban Communities)  
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Figure 6: Estimates for Hypothesized Path Model of Social 
Capital (Rural Communities) 
 
 
 
In both urban (see Figure 5) and rural (see Figure 6) versions 
of the model, organizational participation had a positive effect 
on social capital.  This conformed with prevailing literature 
citing the relevance of membership and participation in formal 
community organizations as an important component of social 
capital.  However, the effect was noticeably stronger in urban 
communities versus rural.  
Though supporting literature on this finding specific to the 
U.K. is lacking, the stronger effects of organizational 
participation on urban social capital versus rural social 
!!
116 
capital is not entirely absent of precedent or rationale.  When 
compared to rural settlements, residents of urban and semi-urban 
communities in Nicaragua have displayed a higher propensity for 
reported affiliations with political parties and credit 
associations (Mitchell and Bossert 2007).  Amidst their cache of 
social capital, rural migrant workers in China tend to refrain 
from including participation in urban organizations; reasons 
cited range from simple preference for social connections 
already established in their villages of origin to status 
marginalization in urban communities serving as obstruction from 
such participation (Palmer, Perkins, and Xu 2011). 
Concerning friendship connections, both bridging and bonding 
friendship networks were also shown to be positive correlates 
with social capital in urban counties. Again, the literature 
offers support here.  Scholars like Jane Jacobs (1961) have been 
quick to highlight the importance of friendships via contact 
opportunities in urban settings as an important precondition to 
social capital.  In urban neighborhoods, noted for their higher 
population counts and diversity, it is not uncommon for 
residents to manage a large collection of friends and casual 
acquaintances towards various ends. Additionally, it may be that 
the pressures of urban living spotlighted by Durkheim, Wirth and 
others cause one to more aggressively seek out and maintain a 
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broader spectrum of primary and secondary friendship 
connections. 
On the other hand, friendship connections contributed very 
little to social capital in the rural U.K. communities.  Thus, 
with respect to friendships, this supports the hypothesis that 
social capital is not conceptually the same between urban and 
rural communities.  One likely explanation for this difference 
between urban and rural social capital concerns the density-
based measurement of friendship networks in the BSAS. 
Consider that a feature of living in dense, urban U.K. 
settings is that social interactions are more likely to occur 
with a broader range of individuals due to lower spatial 
proximity and diversified travel options.  This is especially 
true of elderly city dwellers who are often less susceptible to 
the social isolation experienced by their demographic peers in 
more rural communities (Drennan, Treacy, Butler, Byrne, Fealy, 
Frazer, and Irving 2008). Accordingly, the opportunities to 
build a broader network of friends are more plentiful in urban 
settings due to higher propensity for contact and structure 
features allowing for it versus rural areas. 
Another possible explanation is that in more sparsely 
populated rural settings, while fewer friendship encounters 
occur, fewer friendships also need to be maintained in the 
cultivation of social capital.  Mind you – this should not be 
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taken to mean that rural residents have less meaningful 
friendship bonds than their urban counterparts.  Rather, it just 
may be that in conceptualizing social capital, a measurement of 
social capital via friendship network volume or density would be 
less appropriate for rural settings. 
Finally, turning to trust measures, results here again 
support the prediction that social capital is different across 
urban and rural areas.  For both types of communities, trust had 
positive effects.  This was consistent with prevailing research 
that social capital tends to be higher in communities where 
residents express more trust. 
However, trust measures were more significant in the rural 
model of social capital.  Due to the spatial remoteness 
commensurate with many rural communities, trust – particularly 
that which develops through face-to-face interactions – is a 
major foundational element towards the realization of social 
capital (Townsend, Wallace, Smart, and Norman 2016). As for 
urban settings, it may be that a different kind of trust – 
perhaps one centered less around generalized trust in 
institutions and more akin with a personalized, context-specific 
trust in individuals and/or establishments – resonates more with 
the sort of social capital fostered in urban settings.   
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Jacobs implied as much when describing the custom among 
local residents in her Greenwich Village community of leaving 
their keys with trusted local business owners: 
In our family, for example, when a friend wants to use our 
place while we are away for a weekend or everyone happens 
to be out during the day… we tell such a friend that he can 
pick up the key at the delicatessen across the street.  Joe 
Cornacchia, who keeps the delicatessen, usually has a dozen 
or so keys at a time for handing out like this. 
 
Now why do I, and many others, select Joe as a logical 
custodian for keys?  Because we trust him, first, to be a 
responsible custodian, but equally important because we 
know that he combines a feeling of good will with a feeling 
of no personal responsibility about our private affairs.  
Joe considers it no concern of his whom we choose to permit 
in our places and why. (Jacobs 1961:60) 
 
In this way, residents capitalize upon a constant source of 
nuanced social capital fostered with local businesses by way of 
continued guardianship over their property during extended time 
spent away from their residences. 
 
 
TESTING HYPOTHESES #2 & #3 
 
The next steps – testing the similarity of structural 
effects on crime for urban and rural communities (Hypothesis 
#2), and whether social capital affects crime negatively after 
controlling for these structural effects (Hypothesis #3) – 
entailed developing a full SEM model.  Doing so required 
accounting for the finding that social capital, as measured by 
trust, friendships, and organizational participation, was not 
the same in urban and rural communities.  As a result of this 
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finding, one uniform measure of social capital was created for 
urban communities by summing the mean estimates of trust, 
friendship and organizational participation measures into a 
rudimentary index score.  The resulting index represented an 
approximation of each respective urban counties aggregate level 
of social capital investment as reflected by BSAS respondents 
within those counties. 
For rural social capital, one construct measure was created 
using the composite measures for trust and organizational 
participation.  As with urban settings, the sum of mean 
estimates for the composite variables created an index score as 
a valuation of each counties social capital.  Friendship 
connections were omitted from the rural formula due to their 
aforementioned relative insignificance in a latent social 
capital model.  
 
Results for Hypothesis #2   
As per Tables 7 & 8, results here contradicted the 
hypothesis that ethnic heterogeneity, concentrated disadvantage 
and residential stability demonstrated similar effects on models 
of community crime.  Specifically, the structural variables 
identified resulted in statistically significant models of 
violent and non-violent crime in urban areas of the U.K.  
However, this was not so with rural communities: 
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Table 7: Summary of Regression Coefficients for Urban Crime 
Models 
 
  
Beta 
 
Sig  
(p-value) 
Violent Crimes*   
Pop. Turnover Rate .086 .175 
% of Home Own. -.247 .004 
Ethnicity .396 <.001 
Deprivation Index .788 <.001 
Country -.838 <.001 
Autocorrelation -.003 .964 
 
Non-Violent Crimes**      
Pop. Turnover Rate -.023 .654 
% of Home Own. -.240 <.001 
Ethnicity .234 <.001 
Deprivation Index 1.142 <.001 
Country -1.041 <.001 
Autocorrelation .156 .003 
 
*% of variation explained: 64%; p < .001 
**% of variation explained: 76%; p < .001 
 
 
 
Table 8: Summary of Regression Coefficients for Rural Crime 
Models 
 
 
 Beta Sig  
(p-value) 
Violent Crimes*   
Pop. Turnover Rate -.136 .476 
% of Home Own. -.129 .447 
Ethnicity .020 .915 
Deprivation Index 1.192 <.001 
Country -1.282 <.001 
Autocorrelation -.067 .646 
 
Non-Violent Crimes**      
Pop. Turnover Rate -.091 .672 
% of Home Own. .084 .685 
Ethnicity .304 .175 
Deprivation Index 1.039 .003 
Country -.677 .079 
Autocorrelation .112 .511 
*% of variation explained: 49%; p = .001 
**% of variation explained: 30%; p = .025 
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While the limited sample size of rural counties warrants 
some caution in interpreting these results, it was clear 
nonetheless that only a deprivation-based model was significant 
in the rural settings.  The scarcity here of significant 
covariates for rural crime models may lie in the nature of rural 
living versus life in urban settings.  It could be argued that 
the covariates in this study represented social forces found in 
a body of literature where urban crime is more commonly 
predicted.  Thus, a poor fit to rural crime could be expected 
and it may be that predicting rural activity in U.K. crime 
demands shifting attention to a set of structural factors more 
befitting of less urbanized communities. 
Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that 
concentrated disadvantage held significance in crime models for 
both community types.  Poverty is a problem commonplace to both 
urban and rural communities throughout the U.K. (Layte, Nolan, 
and Whelan 2000; Leonard 2013; Pacione 2004).  Concerning the 
connection between criminal behavior and economic disadvantage, 
Leonard (2013) observed how Ireland’s historical failures to 
address the needs of its poorest population segments has 
routinely resulted in various transgressions from some of these 
same impoverished subgroups.  It is paradigm common throughout 
the U.K. 
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More often than not, the debilitating effects of income and 
resource poverty serve as stimulus for criminal activity in the 
U.K. irrespective of urbanization level.  In addition, the 
significance of the disadvantage variable in this study may 
imply the importance of the measure’s comprehensiveness.  That 
is to say, while such disparity was experienced at considerably 
higher levels in urban communities, the robustness of the 
measure seemed to tap into enough dimensions of disadvantage 
relevant to both urban and rural settings with respect to crime 
rates.  
 
Results for Hypothesis #3   
Estimating a full structural model of violent and non-
violent crime in urban U.K. counties, with the aforementioned 
controls for spatial autocorrelation and urbanization 
distinction, suggested a weak and negative association between 
social capital and crime:  
  
!!
124 
 
Figure 7: Estimates for a Full Structural Model of Violent Urban 
Crime Rates 
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Figure 8: Estimates for a Full Structural Model of Non-Violent 
Urban Crime Rates 
 
 
However, closer inspection of the model through OLS regression 
revealed the proposed model is not supported.  Social capital 
did not hold any influence over U.K. crime rates independent of 
the other structural factors.  As per Table 9, the introduction 
of social capital changed very little about how the crime models 
functioned in urban settings: 
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Table 9: Summary of Regression for Urban Crime Models (with 
Social Capital) 
 
  
Original 
Model* 
 
Model w/ 
Social Capital** 
 
 Beta Sig. 
(p-value) 
  
Beta 
     Sig. 
    (p-value) 
 
Violent Crimes     
Pop. Turnover Rate .086 .175 .088 .176 
% of Home Own. -.247 .004 -.247 .004 
Ethnicity .396 <.001 .396 <.001 
Deprivation Index .788 <.001 .790 <.001 
Country -.838 <.001 -.839 <.001 
Autocorrelation -.003 .964 -.004 .955 
Social Capital N/A N/A .009 .883 
 
*% of variation explained: 64%; p < .001 
**% of variation explained: 63%; p < .001 
 
Non-Violent Crimes       
Pop. Turnover Rate -.023 .654 -.012 .821 
% of Home Own. -.240 <.001 -.241 <.001 
Ethnicity .234 <.001 .237 <.001 
Deprivation Index 1.142 <.001 1.161 <.001 
Country -1.041 <.001 -1.061 <.001 
Autocorrelation .156 .003 .147 .004 
Social Capital  N/A N/A .064 .205 
 
*% of variation explained: 76%; p < .001 
**% of variation explained: 76%; p < .001 
 
  
While there was evidence of statistically significant models 
for both crime types, neither of those models seemed impacted by 
social capital.  This contradicted much of the extant 
literature, but did support the premise that social capital is a 
force that needs to be weighed against a number of contextual 
variables in determining if and how it impacts U.K. crime.  
By comparison, in rural communities, estimates from the 
proposed model implied social capital had a somewhat more 
significant effect on violent crime rates, but remained 
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insignificant for rates of non-violent crime: 
   
 
Figure 9: Estimates for a Full Structural Model of Violent Rural 
Crime Rates and Social Capital 
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Figure 10: Estimates for a Full Structural Model of Non-Violent 
Rural Crime Rates and Social Capital 
 
  
Yet again, OLS regression offers clarity here.  While the urban 
data revealed a variety of effects of structural factors on 
crime, nearly all of those same factors were insignificant to 
rural county crime (see Table 10).  The lone exception, level of 
deprivation, served to accentuate the premise that poverty has 
an enduring effect on crime no matter an area’s extent of 
urbanization: 
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Table 10: Summary of Regression for Rural Crime Models (with 
Social Capital) 
 
  
Original 
Model* 
 
Model w/ 
Social Capital** 
 
 Beta Sig. 
(p-value) 
Beta Sig. 
(p-value) 
 
Violent Crimes     
Pop. Turnover Rate -.136 .476 -.123 .523 
% of Home Own. -.129 .447 -.098 .570 
Ethnicity .020 .915 .020 .913 
Deprivation Index 1.192 <.001 1.368 <.001 
Country -1.282 <.001 -1.455 <.001 
Autocorrelation -.067 .646 -.078 .595 
Social Capital N/A N/A .161 .342 
 
*% of variation explained: 49%; p = .001 
**% of variation explained: 49%; p = .002 
 
 
Non-Violent Crimes       
Pop. Turnover Rate -.091 .672 -.052 .801 
% of Home Own. .084 .685 .167 .411 
Ethnicity .304 .175 .313 .142 
Deprivation Index 1.039 .003 1.441 .001 
Country -.677 .079 -1.082 .015 
Autocorrelation .112 .511 .155 .344 
Social Capital  N/A N/A .356 .068 
 
*% of variation explained: 30%; p = .025 
**% of variation explained: 37%; p = .012 
 
 
Moreover, goodness-of-fit estimates for the proposed models (see 
Table 11) further supported the conclusion that the initial 
models were of poor fit to urban and rural crime: 
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Table 11: Goodness of Fit (Full Models of Crime and Social 
Capital; Urban vs. Rural) 
 
 
 Urban  
(N= 101) 
 Rural  
(N = 30) 
  
GOODNESS OF FIT Viol Crime Non-Viol  
Crime 
 
Viol Crime   Non-Viol  
Crime 
 
Overall chi-square 109.57 155.5 33.137 29.56 
Degrees of freedom 7 7 7 7 
Chi-square significance <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
Number of parameters 29 29 29 29 
Root mean square residual 82.73 91.5 6.77 93.71 
Goodness-of-Fit Index .855 .831 .836 .849 
Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit 
Index 
.254 .131 .156 .225 
Parsimony Goodness-of-Fit 
Index 
.166 .162 .163 .165 
Root mean square error of 
approximation 
.383 .461 .359 .333 
  
 
 
 
 Scholars like Byrne (2006) have noted a well-fitting 
hypothesized model via chi-square testing is not that common.  
Rather, researchers typically see chi-square statistics 
substantially larger than degrees of freedom and low 
probabilities indicating a need to modify the model variables 
and/or increase sample size towards a better fitting model.  As 
forementioned, this dissertation excluded slightly more than 
half of the counties existing in England and Wales between 2000 
and 2001; it is reasonable to assume that more favorable chi-
square estimates could have been produced if more counties were 
available for analysis. 
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RMSEA calculations also indicated the proposed model’s fit 
with both community types was less than ideal, with estimates 
exceeding .10 for all datasets, whereas lower than .05 would be 
have been ideal.  However, Byrne (2006) again revealed that 
RMSEA can tend to “overreject” models when sample sizes are 
small.  Given what we know about counties that had to be 
excluded from this analysis, it may be plausible that a greater 
sample size would have resulted in more favorable RMSEA 
estimates. 
Less stringent tests of model fit would seem more 
appropriate for this data.  However, even then, most of the 
results in this study indicated a poor fitting model; only the 
GFI calculation indicated the model fit U.K. crime data 
reasonably well.  Thus, the third hypothesis was rejected and an 
important question presented itself: exactly what kind of 
model(s) do support the data?   
 
Hypothesis #3 Results by Type of Crime   
Though overall violent and non-violent crime rates were the 
focus of this dissertation, studies of social capital and crime 
have found significant models in instances when specific types 
of crime were differentiated.  Noteworthy here is the work 
Messner and Rosenfeld have pioneered in isolating the effects of 
social capital on homicide (Messner, Rosenfeld, and Baumer 2004; 
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Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001).  As such, while the third 
hypothesis test failed to show social capital as a significant 
factor in models of overall U.K. crime rates, there was reason 
to believe that social capital might fare better for models of 
specific crime types. 
As it turned out, there indeed was no one overall model for 
violent or non-violent crime that was significant.  Rather, as 
presented in Tables 12 – 14, supplemental analysis via 
multivariate OLS regression revealed a few different models 
where particular types of social capital significantly 
contributed to predictive models of U.K. crime rates – each 
model variant by type of crime and community: 
 
Table 12: Summary of Regression Coefficients for Urban Models of 
Harassment* 
 
 
 Beta Sig. 
 
Pop. Turnover Rate .125 .095 
% of Home Own. -.205 .036 
Ethnicity .358 <.001 
Deprivation Index .590 <.001 
Country -.922 <.001 
Autocorrelation -.006 .935 
Social Capital .140 .054 
 
*% of variation explained: 51%; p < .001 
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Table 13: Summary of Regression Coefficients for Urban Models of 
Burglary/Dwelling* 
 
 
 Beta Sig. 
 
Pop. Turnover Rate -.035 .557 
% of Home Own. -.113 .142 
Ethnicity .330 <.001 
Deprivation Index 1.171 <.001 
Country -.898 <.001 
Autocorrelation -.139 .021 
Social Capital .138 .018 
 
*% of variation explained: 69%; p < .001 
 
 
 
Table 14: Summary of Regression Coefficients for Rural Models of 
Motor Vehicle Theft* 
 
 Beta Sig. 
 
Pop. Turnover Rate -.067 .684 
% of Home Own. .326 .055 
Ethnicity .564 .003 
Deprivation Index 1.352 <.001 
Country -1.123 .003 
Autocorrelation .094 .478 
Social Capital .508 .003 
 
*% of variation explained: 59%; p < .001 
 
  
The emergence of these models might explain why the 
initially proposed structural models for testing Hypothesis #3 
fit so poorly.  Those models were derived from assumptions of 
only two singular social capital pathways to comprehending 
overall crime rates varying by urbanization level.  In fact, the 
Hypothesis #3 output suggested a few different models, and each 
nuanced by crime type and urbanization. 
For example, two models revealed that social capital is 
significant and positively correlated with the rate of 
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harassment (b = .140; p = .05) and home burglaries (b = .138; p 
= .018) that occur in urban areas.  Particularly when such 
crimes occur with high frequency in the community, and when the 
community features high levels of mistrust and spatially 
segmentation – common traits of large, densely populated city 
settings in the U.K. – it has been observed that efforts to 
control crimes like harassment and burglary will tend to suffer 
(Hope 2001).  Within such communities, it is possible for 
residents to retain close contact with their neighbors (thus, 
displaying one type of social capital) while simultaneously 
failing to generate the type of social capital that would aid in 
implanting social control over these crimes (Hope 2001; Skogan 
1990). 
Importantly though, the positive effects of social capital 
here were small.  There is also scant empirical support for 
social capital effects on specific crimes like harassment and 
home burglary in the extant urban literature.  Thus, there is 
cause to question the strength of the effect illustrated here, 
along with the rationale for why only these crimes would be 
influenced by social capital in urban English and Welsh 
settlements but not in rural. 
For the rural counties, a model of vehicular theft was the 
sole instance where social capital was of some significance (b = 
.508; p = .003).  However, the effect of social capital here was 
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positive, relatively strong and thus worthy of some 
consideration.  One plausible explanation for social capital’s 
positive effect in this model may lie in the perceptual 
idiosyncrasies of rural communities versus urban settings with 
respect to theft security. 
In rural settings, where camaraderie through reciprocal 
friendships, social trust, and community inclusiveness is 
commonplace, it would not be unusual to find social capital 
(particularly, bonding social capital) in abundance.  Just the 
same, these rural qualities might lend to rural residents 
becoming too trusting of the security of their surroundings such 
that they become more susceptible to certain crimes like vehicle 
theft.  Note the recent data and subsequent warnings from major 
rural insurance providers like NFU Mutual that prospective 
thieves are known to spy on the lifestyles of rural residents in 
order to find ideal opportunities for all manner of theft 
(Mutual 2015). 
From its 2012 Rural Crime Survey, NFU Mutual determined 
theft of and from rural properties to be largely a matter of 
advanced planning and exploitation of opportunities where 
surveillance and safeguards of these properties are minimal 
(Mutual 2015).  A prime opportunity to execute an automotive 
theft would be when farmers take lunch breaks during the day and 
are prone to leave their tractors or other farm vehicles 
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unattended for what they perceive to be too short a period of 
time for such theft to occur.  Such theft is also known to occur 
during known periods when rural residents leave their vehicles 
and similar possessions unattended for extended periods of time 
(e.g., during “tea” times or end-of-week excursions into town), 
and police response times are anticipated to be slower (Mutual 
2015). 
Insurance data aside, there is little prior evidence from 
rural U.K. settings explaining why vehicular theft models would 
be so strongly affected by social capital, and the positive 
coefficient calculated does contradict much of the extant 
literature extolling negative relationships between social 
capital and crime.  Nonetheless, irrespective of urbanization 
level, a positive correlation between social capital itself 
and/or components of it and various forms of criminal and/or 
deviant activity is not entirely unprecedented. 
Certain delinquent peer groups (i.e., adolescent alcohol 
drinkers) have shown that their delinquency can serve as a key 
cohesive element lending to the group’s existence (Kreager, 
Rulison, and Moody 2011).  This work is further supported with 
evidence across multiple countries of social capital’s pivotal 
role in the establishment and sustenance of organized crime 
syndicates (Koppen 2013; Lo 2010; Steffensmeier and Ulmer 2006). 
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Carson (2004) noted how social capital by way of strong 
social ties could be associated with higher crime and diminished 
informal social control in a community.  In such settings, 
albeit typically urban, social ties that are geographically 
restricted can contribute to crime by discouraging collective 
responses to local community problems (Carson 2004; Morenoff, 
Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001).  This, again, would serve to 
explain the positive association between specific crimes like 
vehicular theft and social capital in rural U.K. areas.    
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CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSION 
As findings from this study suggested, social capital in the 
UK is not the same construct once urban and rural communities 
are distinguished from each other.  It was also clear that 
structural variables known to influence UK crime rates vary in 
their effects due in part to a community’s urbanization level.  
Finally, this dissertation demonstrated that social capital’s 
effects on such rates are rather limited and warrant 
specification in the type of crime being measured along with 
urbanization level.  While these findings from the study were 
clear, some limitations throughout the project should be 
recognized.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
First, in moving forward with research of this nature, 
significant efforts could be made to address a number of factors 
impacting the precision of the models proposed in this study.  
Concerning one such factor, sample size, certain constraints 
documented earlier in this dissertation resulted in only 
communities in England and Wales being studied, and only those 
with residents who had at least 10 respondents complete the 2001 
BSAS study.  This made for a less comprehensive analysis of both 
the two countries and of the U.K. as a whole.  While these 
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limitations were understood in advance and unavoidable, they 
nonetheless serve as key points of areas for improvement.  A 
greater sampling of counties – especially rural – would likely 
improve both the explained variance of data for the derived 
models and the strength of tests for spatial autocorrelation. 
A second possible improvement would be to address the 
limited degrees of freedom in this study’s SEM models by 
developing a more sophisticated structural model.  While 
residential stability, ethnic heterogeneity and concentrated 
disadvantage are among the more common covariates influencing 
crime rates in U.K., additional variables are likely relevant.  
This is notable in light of the scarcity in variables that were 
statistically significant for rural crime rate models.  
Identifying more relevant structural covariates to crime in 
rural settings would almost certainly improve the estimation of 
social capital effects on crime. 
Thirdly, the difficulty in measuring social capital in this 
study is not to be overlooked.  While social capital literature 
generally supports using measurements for trust, friendship 
networks, and organizational participation, the BSAS instrument 
revealed some specific limitations that altered analytical 
strength in this research. In particular, a more robust, 
qualitative measurement of friendship measures apropos for 
assessing rural residents, as well as alternative definitions of 
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trust for urban dwellers, might prove well in determining a 
clearer measurement of social capital. 
Limitations notwithstanding, there appears to be enough 
evidence to suggest that there are applicable models of crime in 
the U.K. that incorporate social capital, and that those models 
vary based upon the urbanization level of a community and the 
type of crime rate in question.  However, failure to fit a 
proposed model of overall violent and non-violent crime rate to 
this data serves as both a caution against abiding too rigidly 
to preexisting notions of social capital-crime paradigms, and 
confirmation that further international scholarship in this area 
is warranted.  While some of this dissertation’s results may be 
attributable to methodological limitations, there is enough 
evidence to warrant future research in the U.K. and abroad 
towards building better crime models within the discourse of 
social capital. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Amidst the current context of social science discourse, 
heightened awareness of place dynamics and “community-
mindedness” is undeniable.  As Sampson notes:  
Community has been prescribed for much of what allegedly 
ails modern society.  Indeed, calls for a return to 
community values and neighborhood governance are being 
heard from across the spectrum. (Sampson 2004:106)(Sampson 
2004)  
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Similarly, concerning development of crime theory and policy in 
the modern era, ecological concepts like social capital are 
undoubtedly relevant.  However, each attempt to apply social 
capital towards a community's crime problems must be weighed 
against the traits that define the community, which crimes are 
to be targeted through such efforts, and the nuances of how each 
crime is influenced by these traits.  Great care must also be 
taken not to force notions of social capital into settings where 
is does not apply or where advanced specification is required.  
As this dissertation revealed, social capital models applicable 
in one geography (i.e., the United States) do not necessarily 
apply in another (i.e., the United Kingdom). 
On the matter of variable clarification, there was some 
indication in the data of an underlying segmentation between 
organizational participation measures.  Specifically, while 
scale reliability in this study ultimately supported aggregating 
the seven participation variables into one component, there were 
two conceptual areas of participation being measured in the 
BSAS: 1.) participation connected to a specific foundation of 
belief (e.g., a specific religion, ideology or doctrine), and 
2.) organizational participation related to one or more 
activities one would be or want to be involved in largely or 
entirely unbound by any specific belief. 
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Captured under the former would be membership and activity 
in organizations political, religious, or charitable in nature 
that imply adherence to some core set of ideals that frame the 
activity of the organizations’ members and fuel the desire for 
those to join and/or stay as members.  Alternatively, the latter 
type of participation seems comprised of affiliation with trade 
organizations, sports clubs, and the like that seem 
comparatively more secular or apolitical in nature.  With a 
robust dataset covering both more of the U.K. and additional 
measures of organizational activity, a more sophisticated 
exploration and possible implementation of participation 
measures would be feasible.  Further studies of U.K. crime with 
social capital as primary variable would require such efforts.  
Considering that an underlying premise of this dissertation 
was the notion that social phenomena like crime are rarely 
distributed randomly across geographic spaces, it was expected 
that crime rates at a community level would reflect some degree 
of congruency due to spatial proximity with structurally similar 
areas.  Neighboring urban areas often exhibit greater similarity 
in crime rates between one another, and the same typically holds 
true for rural areas.  Such spatial autocorrelation has been 
shown present across vastly different geographic settings – from 
violent crimes in urban Chicago neighborhoods (Morenoff, 
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Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001) to property crime in residential 
communities in Turkey (Erdogan, Yalcin, and Dereli 2013). 
Yet, there was surprisingly little support for spatial 
autocorrelation in this research.  Only non-violent crime in 
rural counties seemed marginally significant (b = .156; p = 
.003) when compared with the other structural covariates.  
Otherwise, English and Welsh counties illustrated no evidence of 
spatial clustering of crime in either urban or rural areas.  
Despite this lack of evidence, spatial clustering was important 
to explore and should remain a key consideration in future 
efforts modeled from this research. 
Finally, with only England, and to a more limited extent 
Wales, covered in this dissertation, the discourse initiated in 
this study needs to expand to Scotland and Northern Ireland, as 
well as more countries with suitable data to support such 
aggregate-level analysis.  Concurrently, applying the 
dissertation methodology to more recent data on crime, 
structural demographic activity, and social capital for 
communities in such countries would be ideal.  For instance, 
presently there are variants of such measures available from 
nationally representative studies of social life in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, but these studies vary considerably in how key 
variables like social capital and urbanization are measured. 
Thus, separate studies should be considered for these countries 
!!
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with this dissertation serving as a point of reference. 
Scotland, as one example, administers the Scottish Social 
Attitudes Survey (SSAS), which has measures similar to the BSAS 
but with divergent sets of questions for items representing 
social capital.  For Northern Ireland, while there is no 
national study that approximates social capital in the manner of 
the BSAS or the SSAS, a number of smaller localized studies – 
most notably, the doctoral work completed by Dr. Paul Surgenor 
through the University of Ulster-Coleraine (Surgenor 2004) – 
might be applicable.  All such countries maintain a uniform 
database for crime rate and Census-level demographic data, as 
well as some layered structure for defining communities by 
urbanization level.   !
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: BSAS Variables Measuring “Trust” 
 
How much do you trust British governments of any party to place 
the needs of the nation above the interests of their own 
political party? 
 
(Answer Choices – 1. Almost never; 2. Only some of the time; 3. 
Most of the time; 4. Just about always) 
 
The United Kingdom government at Westminster has responsibility 
for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. How much do 
you trust the UK government at Westminster to work in the best 
long-term interests of England? Please take your answer from 
this card.  
 
(Answer Choices – 1. Almost never; 2. Only some of the time; 3. 
Most of the time; 4. Just about always) 
 
Please tick a box to show how much you trust…  
 
 a. …governments of any party to spend taxpayers’ money wisely 
for the benefit of everyone?  
 b. …NHS hospitals to spend their money wisely for the benefit 
of their patients? 
 c. …private hospitals to spend their money wisely for the 
benefit of their patients? 
 d. …state schools to spend their money wisely for the benefit 
of their pupils?    
 e. …private fee-paying schools to spend their money wisely 
for the benefit of their pupils? 
 f. …local councils to spend their money wisely for the 
benefit of local people? 
 g. …private pension companies to spend their money wisely for 
the benefit of their pensioners?     
 h. …the state pension scheme to spend its money wisely for 
the benefit of pensioners? 
 i. …police forces to spend their money wisely for the benefit 
of local people?   
   
(Answer Choices – 1. Not at all; 2. Not much; 3. Quite a bit; 4. 
A great deal)  
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Appendix B: BSAS Variables Measuring “Organizational 
Participation” 
 
People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or 
associations.  The list below contains different types of 
groups. For each type of group, please tick a box to say whether 
you have taken part in the activities of this group in the past 
12 months.  
 
 - A political party, club or association  
   
 - A trade union or professional association  
  
 - A church or other religious organization  
 
 - A sports group, hobby or leisure club  
  
 - A charitable organization or group  
  
 - A neighborhood association or group  
  
 - Other associations or groups  
  
(Answer Choices – 1. I do not belong to such a group; 2. I 
belong to such a group but never taken part; 3. I have taken 
part once or twice; 4. I have taken part more than twice) 
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